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by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]
[Victor Goldschmidt, entry directory]
[Goldschmidt, Le système stoïcien, entry directory]
[The following is summary. Bracketed commentary is my own, as is any boldface. Proofreading is incomplete, which means typos are present, especially in the quotations. So consult the original text. Also, I welcome corrections to my interpretations, because I am not good enough with French or Greek to make accurate translations of the texts.]
Summary of
Victor Goldschmidt
Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps
Deuxième partie:
Aspects temporels de la morale stoïcienne
A
La Connaissance
Chapitre IV
L’interprétation des événements
1
L’interprétation a l’échelle cosmique
2.1.4.1.37
Interprétation finaliste
Brief summary:
(2.1.4.1.37.1) We are here concerned with divination as it is applied to human life and as it is something that confers moral significance. [And as we will see, this concern will take us away from the notion of divination and more toward moral actions in the present.] (2.1.4.1.37.2) The Stoics seem to want two incompatible things. On the one hand they want providence, which is like final causality and thus which seems to suggest strict causal determinism, but they also want there to be some moral significance in the present, which would seem to call for an indeterminate element where moral choice comes into play. (2.1.4.1.37.3) We might also want to think of this far-fetched and anthropocentric sort of finalism according to which all past and future events can be divined as not really being absolutely central to the Stoic system. (2.1.4.1.37.4) And given the difficulties that the Stoic’s teleological notion of providence presents, we are encouraged to understand the philosophy of time without such an emphasis on it. (2.1.4.1.37.5) But in fact, to understand the Stoics, we must keep their notion of providence but not the radical notions of divination and finality. The more important idea here is the moral one, and not the physical one. Providence for the Stoics was a matter of all things working together for the good of the whole. Sometimes on the individual level we see how the good that happens to us serves that greater good as well. But when bad happens to us, we should see that it is still good rendered to the whole. Thus the Stoic notion of providence is more a matter of how we temper our desires and expectations in order to correspond to divine providence, as understood in this more indirect, vague, or implicit way. (2.1.4.1.37.6) So under this other view, we still affirm providence, but we also acknowledge that we can only know the general ends of particular events, and we cannot know the specific ends in terms of the precise role they play in attaining that greater good. However, with this broader sense of the whole in mind, we can still look to the causes of events [which is perhaps the closest equivalent to “divination” that we will find in the Stoics.]
[Divination and the Present Event]
[Providence, Final Causality, and the Morality of the Present]
[The Non-Centrality of Providence in Stoic Philosophy]
[Non-Teleological Emphasis in the Stoic Philosophy of Time]
[Providence, Morality, and the Good of the Whole]
[Providence without Divination. Knowledge of Particular Causes without Knowledge of Particular Ends]
Summary
2.1.4.1.37
Interprétation finaliste
[Divination and the Present Event]
(p.85-86: “37 Nous n’avons pas à envisager ici cette interprétation …”)
[In sum: We are concerned with divination as it is applied to human life and as it is something that confers moral significance.]
We here are concerned neither with the divinatory interpretation in its entirety nor with its different techniques, which vary according to the objects involved in the interpretation. We are simply interested here in the possibilities and limits of this divinatory interpretation of present-event signs, insofar as it is applied to the events of human life and insofar as they are confer a moral significance. So let us turn now to the way the Stoics understood providence, which is a finalist interpretation.
37 Nous n’avons pas à envisager ici cette interprétation dans son ensemble, ni dans ses différentes techniques qui varient selon les objets étudiés. Seules, nous intéressent ici les possibilités et les limites de cette interprétation, appli- | quée aux événements de la vie humaine et chargée de conférer à ceux-ci une signification morale. Considérons d’abord l’usage fait de l’idée de providence, c’est-à-dire l’interprétation finaliste.
(85-86)
[Providence, Final Causality, and the Morality of the Present]
(p.86: “On sait que l’explication des choses …”)
[In sum: The Stoics want providence, which is like final causality and thus which seems to suggest strict causal determinism, but they also want there to be some moral significance in the present, which would seem to call for an indeterminate element where moral choice comes into play.]
In our times, the idea that we can explain events on the basis of finality (final causes) is not taken too serious [on account of the predominance of efficient causality in our modern, scientific view.] And we must also recognize that in fact this was the view of the Stoics. [See the text for the next idea. It might be that since the Stoics have both providence (which guides the course of events) and an interest in the present (which they would like to see have some greater significance in its presence than just being a causally determined event, maybe even as having a moral significance where we must make moral choices that are not causally predetermined for us), they have a problematic sort of finality.]
On sait que l’explication des choses et des événements par la finalité a été poussée, au jugement des modernes, jusqu’au ridicule. Sur ce point, il faut bien dire que le système du Portique devra plaider coupable. L’affirmation de la providence universelle, d’une part, le goût du concret, d’autre part, devaient conduire, dans l’explication des choses, à un finalisme intempérent ; il faudra, pour reprendre l’idée de Collingwood, la méthode mathématique, pour que les savants de la Renaissance puissent résoudre (d’une certaine manière) le même problème, à partir du même « présupposé ».
(86)
[The Non-Centrality of Providence in Stoic Philosophy]
(p.86: “ Cela dit, on peut penser que ce finalisme …”)
[In sum: We might also want to think of this far-fetched and anthropocentric sort of finalism as not really being absolutely central to the Stoic system.]
[But we can also think of this anthropocentric and far-fetched sort of finality as lying outside the system. Where it does come into play is theodicy discussions when adversaries demand a detailed account of providence and also when dealing with matters of popular belief, likes dreams, horoscopes, and divinations. And finally we see it in matters of state religion.]
Cela dit, on peut penser que ce finalisme outrancier et, surtout, anthropocentrique (non dans son principe sans doute, mais dans ses applications de détail), demeure quelque peu extérieur au système. Il intervient dans la théodicée1, c’est-à-dire dans la discussion avec les adversaires qui exigeaient des comptes détaillés du principe général de la providence. Il intervient aussi, par suite d’un souci, courant alors, de vulgarisation et presque de propagande, dans l’interprétation des croyances populaires (songes, horoscope, divination)2. Ila encore sa place dans la justification des différentes pratiques de la « religion d’Etat »; il sert souvent de méthode à ce que Varron appelle la theologia ciuilis3.
(86)
1. Cf. E. Bréhier, Chrysippe, p. 205.
2. Cf. aussi M.-Aurèle, IX, 27, 3 : « Les dieux eux-mêmes viennent en aide (aux méchants) de mille manières, par des songes, des oracles, et justement pour leur faire obtenir les objets en vue desquels ils se tourmentent » (et qui ne tourmentent précisément pas le sage) ; cf. IX, II, 2.
3 Varron, ap. St Aug., Cité de Dieu, VI, V (cf. IV, XXVII) ; cf. Aetius, I, 6, 9 (Dox. Gr., 295) ; des exposés détaillés chez Cicéron, p. ex. de nat. deor., II, LXVI, 165; de diu., I, passim.
(86)
[Non-Teleological Emphasis in the Stoic Philosophy of Time]
(p.86: “« Il est évident », a-t -on dit, …”)
[In sum: Given the difficulties that the Stoic’s teleological notion of providence presents, we are encouraged to understand the philosophy of time without such an emphasis on it.]
[So, as Bréhier notes, the Stoic notion of teleology raises difficulties. And we may rather find that to understand the Stoic notion of time, we would not place such importance on the teleological notion of providence. (Please check the text to be sure.)]
« Il est évident », a-t-on dit, « que cette conception téléologique devait, dans le détail des faits, se montrer pleine de difficultés »4. Aussi l’interprétation propose-t-elle parfois d’autres réponses dont on peut penser, tout ensemble, qu’elles renoncent à cette conception téléologique et qu’elles tiennent plus près au système.
(86)
4. E. Bréhier, Chrysippe, p.204.
(86)
[Providence, Morality, and the Good of the Whole]
(p.86-88: “« Il est évident », a-t -on dit, …”)
[In sum: But in fact, to understand the Stoics, we must keep their notion of providence but not the notion of divination. The more important idea here is the moral one, and not the physical one. Providence for the Stoics was a matter of all things working together for the good of the whole. Sometimes on the individual level we see how the good that happens to us serves that greater good as well. But when bad happens to us, we should see that it is still good rendered to the whole. Thus the Stoic notion of providence is more a matter of how we temper our desires and expectations.]
[Nonetheless, the Stoics never abandon the principle of providence. And in fact, it is still rigorously applied in their system. (What we have in mind is to reject this interpretation of providential finality but not its application. ((I am not sure if we are talking about event-interpretation or an interpretation of the Stoic philosophy. The idea here might even be that we keep providence without the notion that humans can divine anything and everything about the future.)) We then note the following two things.{1} By suspending our interest in the individual and in the whole, we obtain an anthropocentric finalism. For the world is made of gods and men and it is designed to serve their interests. ((I am going to get the next idea wrong, so please consult the text. It might be the following, if I may please make a guess, which will be based on things I came across in Marcus Aurelius. We have providence in the sense that all things are designed for gods and men. This is something we can know and discover by looking at nature. But often times things in the world do not go according to our best interests. When this happens, we find that we are unable to see how the current bad event ultimately works in our advantage. At such times, we cannot relate the event in terms of some finality, at least not one that fits our notion of divine providence, which has some final good in mind. However, we can in these instances see that whatever bad is happening to us is part of the providential benefit of the whole. So by refusing divinatory interpretation, we do not question providence, we simply call into question our personal preferences that are ignorant of the good of the greater whole. Thus this rejection of divinationism is bound up with the purification of the passions and the asceticism of our desires; for, we should learn not to desire things which are not for the greater good, and in fact we should even desire the bad things that happen to us, since they are for the greater good. Here are some passages from Marcus Aurelius that speak to this notion:
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations (copied from the Hutchenson and Moor translation at Online Library of Liberty):
6.1. The matter of the universe is obedient, and easily changed: the intelligence, which governs it, has no cause in itself, of doing evil to any. It has no malice; nor can it do any thing maliciously; nor is any one hurt by it. It is the cause of all that happens, as it executes all things.
4.40. Consider always this universe as one living being or animal; with one material substance, and one spirit; and how all things are referred to the sense of this spirit; and how it’s will accomplishes all things, and how the whole concurs to the production of every thing; and what a connexion and contexture there is among all things.
6.38. Consider frequently the connexion of all things in the universe, and the relation they bear to each other. All things are, as it were, entangled with each other, and are, therefore, mutually friendly. This is a natural consequence, or, in a natural series, with the other; either by connexion of place, or mutual conspiring to the same end, or by continuity of substance.
7.9. All things are linked with each other, and bound together with a sacred bond: Scarce is there one thing quite foreign to another. They are all arranged together in their proper places, and jointly adorn the same world. There is one orderly graceful disposition of the whole. There is one God in the whole. There is one substance, one law, and one reason common to all intelligent beings, and one truth; as there must be one sort of perfection to all beings, who are of the same nature, and partake of the same rational power.
4.45. Things subsequent are naturally connected with those which preceeded: They are not as numbers of things independent of each other, yet necessarily succeeding; but they are in a regular connexion. And as things now existing are joined together in the most apposite contexture; so, those which ensue, have not barely a necessary succession, but a wonderful suitableness and affinity to what preceeded.
2.3. Whatever the Gods ordain, is full of wise providence. What we ascribe to fortune, happens not without a presiding nature, nor without a connexion and intertexture with the things ordered by providence. Thence all things flow. Consider, too, the necessity of these events; and their utility to that whole universe of which you are a part. In every regular structure, that must always be good to a part, which the nature of the whole requires, and which tends to preserve it.
4.42. There is no evil befalls the things which suffer a change; nor any good in arising into being from a change.
4.43. Time is a river, or violent torrent of things coming into being; each one, as soon as it has appeared, is swept off and disappears, and is succeeded by another, which is swept away in its turn.
4.44. Whatever happens, is as natural, and customary, and known, as a rose in the spring, or fruit in summer. Such are diseases, deaths, calumnies, treacheries, and all which gives fools either joy or sorrow.
7.10. Every thing material shall soon vanish, and be swallowed up in the matter of the whole. Every active principle shall soon be resumed into the intelligence and cause of the whole. And the memory of every thing shall soon be buried in eternity.
2.14.If thou shouldst live three thousand years, or as many myriads, yet remember this, that no man loses any other life than that he now lives; and that he now lives no other life than what he is parting with, every instant. The longest life, and the shortest, come to one effect: since the present time is equal to all, what is lost or parted with is equal to all. And for the same reason, what is parted with, is only a moment. No man at death parts with, or, is deprived of, what is either past or future. For how can one take from a man what he hath not? We should also remember these things, first, That all things which have happened in the continued revolutions from eternity, are of the same kind with what we behold: And ‘tis of little consequence, whether a man beholds the same things for an hundred years, or an infinite duration. Again that the longest and the shortest lives have an equal loss at Death. The present moment is all which either is deprived of, since that is all he has. A man cannot part with what he has not.
5.23. Consider frequently, how swiftly all things which exist, or arise, are swept away, and carried off. Their substance is as a river in a perpetual course. Their actions are in perpetual changes, and the causes subject to ten thousand alterations. Scarce any thing is stable. And the vast eternities, past and ensuing, are close upon it on both hands; in which all things are swallowed up. Must he not, then, be a fool, who is either puffed up with success in such things; or is distracted, and full of complaints about the contrary; as if it could give disturbance of any duration?
6.4. All things now existing shall speedily be changed, either by exhaling and rarifying, if all be one substance; or be dissolved and dispersed into the several elements.
7.25. All things you behold, shall the nature presiding in the universe change; and out of their substance make other things; and others, again, out of theirs; that the universe may be always new.
7.18. Does one dread a change? What can arise without changes? What is more acceptable or more usual to the nature of the whole? Can you warm your bagnio, unless wood undergoes a change? Can you be nourished, unless your food is changed? Or, can any thing useful be accomplished, without changes? Don’t you see, then, that your undergoing a change, too, may be equally necessary to the nature of the whole?
7.32. Concerning death. ‘Tis either a dispersion, or atoms, a vanishing, an extinction, or a translation to another state.
4.14. You have arisen as a part in the universe, you shall disappear again, returning into your source; or, rather, by a change shall be resumed again, into that productive intelligence from whence you came.
4.21. If the animal souls remain after death, how hath the aether contained them from eternity? How doth the earth contain so many bodies buried, during so long a time? As in this case the bodies, after remaining a while in the earth, are dissipated and changed, to make room for other bodies, so the animal souls removed to the air, after they have remained some time, are changed, diffused, rekindled, and resumed into the original productive spirit, and give place to others in like manner to cohabit with them. This may be answered, upon supposition that the souls survive their bodies. We may consider, beside the human bodies which are buried, the bodies of so many beasts, which we and other animals feed on. What a multitude of them is thus consumed, and buried in the bodies of those who feed on them, and yet the same places still afford room, by the changes into blood, air and fire. The true account of all these things is by distinguishing between the material, and the active or efficient principle.
2.9. Remember these things always: what the nature of the universe is: what thine own nature: and how related to the universe: What sort of part thou art, and of what sort of whole: and that no man can hinder thee to act and speak what is agreeable to that whole, of which thou art a part.
8.54. Don’t content yourself in merely corresponding with the surrounding air, by breathing in it; but correspond in sentiment with that intelligence which surrounds all things. For, this intelligence diffuses itself to all, and advances toward all those who can draw it in, no less than the air does to such as can receive it into themselves by breathing.
10.17. Frequently represent to your imagination a view of the whole of time, and the whole of substance: And that every individual thing is, in substance, as a grain of millet; and, in duration, as a turn of a wimble.
6.41. Whenever you imagine, any of these things which are not in your power, are good or evil to you; if you fall into such imagined evils, or are disappointed of such goods, you must necessarily accuse the Gods, and hate those men, who, you deem, were the causes, or suspect will be causes of such misfortunes. Our solicitude about such things leads to a great deal of injustice. But, if we judge only the things in our power, to be good or evil, there remains no further cause of accusing the Gods, or of any hostile disposition against men.
5.1. When you find yourself, in a morning, averse to rise, have this thought at hand: I arise to the proper business of a man: And shall I be averse to set about that work for which I was born, and for which I was brought into the universe? Have I this constitution and furniture of soul granted me by nature, that I may lye among bed-cloaths and keep my self warm? But, say you, This state is the pleasanter. Were you then formed for pleasure, and not at all for action, and exercising your powers? Don’t you behold the vegetables, the little sparrows, the ants, the spiders, the bees, each of them adorning, on their part, this comely world, as far as their powers can go? And will you decline to act your part as a man for this purpose? Won’t you run to that which suits your nature? But, say you, must we not take rest? You must: but nature appoints a measure to it, as it has to eating and drinking. In rest you are going beyond these measures; beyond what is sufficient: but in action, you have not come up to the measure; you are far within the bounds of your power: you don’t then love yourself; otherwise, you would have loved your own nature, and its proper will or purpose. Other artificers, who love their respective arts, can even emaciate themselves by their several labours, without due refreshments of bathing or food: but you honour your nature and its purpose much less than the Turner does his art of turning, or the dancer does his art, the covetous man his wealth, or the vain man his applause. All these when struck with their several objects, don’t more desire to eat or sleep, than to improve in what they are fond of. And do social affectionate actions appear to you meaner, and deserving less diligence and application?
7.45. Whatever happens to any one, is profitable to the whole. This is enough. But, if you attend, you will see this also holds universally; that, what happens to any one man, is profitable also to others. Let the word profitable be taken, here, in a more popular sense, to relate to things indifferent.
8.50. Is the cucumber bitter? Throw it away. Are there thorns in the way? Walk aside. That is enough. Don’t be adding; “Why were such things in the universe?” A naturalist would laugh at you, as would a carpenter, too, or a shoe-maker, if you were finding fault, because shavings and parings of their Works are lying about in their work-houses. These artificers have places too without their work-shops, where they can throw these superfluities. But the nature of the whole has no external place for this purpose: And herein its art is wonderful, that, having circumscribed itself within certain bounds, all within it which seems corrupting, waxing old, or useless, it transforms into itself, and, out of them, makes other new forms; so as neither to need matter from without, nor want a place where to cast out its superfluities. ‘Tis satisfied with its own substance, its own space, and its own art.
7.56. Consider your life as now finished and past. What little surplus there is beyond expectation, spend it according to nature.
8.17. If this matter is in your own power, Why do you act thus? If it is not, whom do you accuse? It must either be the a-toms, or the Gods. To accuse either is a piece of madness. There is nothing therefore to be accused or blamed. Correct the matter, if you can. If not, to what purpose complain? Now, nothing should be done to no purpose.
4.34. Resign yourself willingly to your destiny, allowing it to involve you in what matters it pleases.
10.5. Whatever happens to you, it was before preparing for you from eternity; and the concatenation of causes had, from eternity, interwoven your subsistence with this contingency.
11.33. ‘Tis madness to expect figs in winter; so it is, to expect to retain a child, when [fate] allows it not.
11.34. Epictetus advises that when a father is fondly kissing his child, he should say within himself, “he is, perhaps, to die tomorrow.” Words of bad omen, say you. Nothing is of bad omen, says he, which intimates any of the common works of nature. Is it of bad omen, to say corn must be reaped in harvest?
7.57. Love and desire that alone which happens to you, and is destined by providence for you; for, what can be more suitable?
5.27. Don’t let your thoughts dwell upon what you want, so much, as, upon what you have. And consider the things you enjoy, which are dearest to you; how earnestly and anxiously you would desire them, if you wanted them: And yet be on your guard; lest, by your delighting in the enjoyment of such things, you enure yourself to value them too much; so that if you should lose them, you would be much disturbed.
10.18. Consider, with attention, each of the things around you as already dissolving, and in a state of change, and, as it were, corruption, or dissipation; or, as each formed by nature such as to die.
4.48. Consider frequently how many physicians, who had often knit their brows on discovering the prognostics of death in their patients, have at last yielded to death themselves: And how many astrologers, after foretelling the deaths of others, with great ostentation of their art; and how many philosophers, after they had made many long dissertations upon death and immortality; how many warriors, after they had slaughtered multitudes; how many tyrants, after they had exercised their power of life and death with horrid pride, as if they had been immortal; nay, how many whole cities, if I may so speak, are dead: Helice, Pompeij, Herculanum, and others innumerable. Then run over those whom, in a series, you have known, one taking care of the funeral of another, and then buried by a third, and all this in a short time. And, in general, all human affairs are mean, and but for a day. What yesterday was a trifling embryo, to morrow shall be an embalmed carcase, or ashes. Pass this short moment of time according to nature, and depart contentedly; as the full ripe olive falls of its own accord, applauding the earth whence it sprung, and thankful to the tree that bore it.
8.6. ‘Tis the constant business of the universal nature, to be transferring what is now here, into another place; to be changing things, and carrying them hence, and placing them elsewhere. All are changes; all are customary; you need not fear any thing new. All are subjected to the same law.
8.16. Remember, it equally becomes a man truly free, to change his course, of himself, when he thinks fit, and to follow the advice of another who suggests better measures; for this is also your own action, accomplished according to your own desire, and judgment, and understanding.
9.19. All things are in a state of change; and you are yourself under continual transmutation; and, in some respect, corruption: and so is the whole universe.
10.7. The parts of the whole, all the parts, I mean, which the universe contains, must needs be in a state of corruption. Let this expression be used for denoting a state of change. If then, I say, this be both evil and necessary to them, the whole cannot possibly be in a right state; since the parts are prone to change, and remarkably form’d for corrupting.—For, whether did nature herself take in hand to do evil to the parts of herself, and to make them both subject to fall into evil, and such as of necessity have fallen into evil? Or has this happened without her knowledge?—Both these are equally incredible.—And if one, quitting the notion of a [presiding] nature, mean only that things are so constituted; how ridiculous! to say, the parts of the whole, by their very constitution, tend to change; and yet be surpris’d, or fretted, at any thing, as happening contrary to the nature of things: especially, too, as the dissolution of every thing is into those very elements of which it is compos’d. For it is either a dissipation of those elements of which it was a mixture; or a conversion of them: of the solid to the earthy, and the spirituous to the aerial. So that these too are taken into the plan of the whole, which is either to undergo periodical conflagrations, or be renewed by perpetual changes. And don’t think you had all the earthy and the aerial parts from your birth. They were late accessions of yesterday or the day before, by your food, and the air you breathed. These accessions, therefore, are changed, and not what your mother bore. Grant that this their change into the peculiar nature of your body makes you cling earnestly to them, it alters nothing of what I was just now saying.
4.49. Stand firm like a promontory, upon which the waves are always breaking. It not only keeps its place, but stills the fury of the waves. [Wretched am I, says one, that this has befallen me. Nay, say you, happy I, who, tho’ this has befallen me, can still remain without sorrow, neither broken by the present, nor dreading the future. The like might have befallen any one; but every one could not have remained thus undejected. Why should the event be called a misfortune, rather than this strength of mind a felicity? But, can you call that a misfortune, to a man, which does not frustrate the intention of his nature? Can that frustrate the intention of it, or hinder it to attain its end, which is not contrary to the will or purpose of his nature; What is this will or purpose? Sure you have learned it. Doth this event hinder you to be just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, cautious of rash assent, free from error, possessed of a sense of honour and modesty, and of true liberty; or from meriting those other characters, which whoever enjoys, hath all his nature requires, as its proper perfection? And then, upon every occasion of sorrow, remember the maxim, that this event is not a misfortune, but the bearing it courageously is a great felicity.]
5.8. As, when ‘tis said, that, Aesculapius1 hath prescribed to one a course of riding, or the cold bath, or walking bare-footed; so it may be said, that the nature presiding in the whole, hath prescribed to one a disease, a maim, a loss of a child, or such like. The word “prescribed,” in the former case, imports that he enjoined it as conducing to health; and in the latter too, whatever befalls any one, is appointed as conducive to the purposes of fate or providence. Our very word for happening to one, is, to go together appositely, as the squared stones in walls or pyramids, are said by the workmen, to fall or join together, and suit each other in a certain position. Now, there is one grand harmonious composition of all things; and as the regular universe is formed such a complete whole of all the particular bodies, so the universal destiny or fate of the whole, is made a complete cause out of all the particular causes. The very vulgar understand what I say. They tell you, “fate ordered this event for such a one, and this was prescribed or appointed for him.” Let us understand this even as when we say, “the physician has ordered such things for the patient”: for, he prescribes many harsh disagreeable things; which, yet, we embrace willingly, for the sake of health. Conceive, then, the accomplishing and completing the purposes of the universal nature, to be in the universe, what your health is to you, and thus embrace whatever happens, altho’ it should appear harsh and disagreeable: because it tends to the health of the universe, to the prosperity and felicity of Jupiter in his administration. He never had permitted this event, had it not conduced to good. We see not any particular nature aiming at or admitting what does not suit the little private system, in which it presides. Should you not on these two accounts embrace and delight in what ever befalls you; one is, that it was formed, and prescribed, and adapted for you, and destined originally by the most venerable causes; the other, that it is subservient to the prosperity, and complete administration of that mind, which governs the whole; nay, by Jupiter! to the stability and permanence of the whole. For, the whole would be maimed and imperfect, if you broke off any part of this continued connexion, either of parts or causes. Now, you break this off, and destroy it, as far as you can, when you repine at any thing which happens.
8.36. Don’t confound yourself, by considering the whole of your future life; and by dwelling upon the multitude, and greatness of the pains or troubles, to which you may probably be exposed. But ask yourself about such as are present, is there any thing intolerable and unsufferable in them? You’ll be ashamed to own it. And, then, recollect, that it is neither what is past, nor what is future, which can oppress you; ‘tis only what is present. And this will be much diminished, if you circumscribe or consider it by itself; and chide your own mind, if it cannot bear up against this one thing thus alone.
8.22. Attend well to what is at present before you; whether it be a maxim, an action, or a speech. ‘Tis just you should suffer, because you neglect your present business; and would rather become a good man to morrow, than to day.
7.8. Be not disturbed about futurity: You shall come to encounter with future events, possessed of the same reason you now employ in your present affairs.
(Marcus Aurelius 2014. Texts copied from Online Library of Liberty)
Here is the Goldschmidt quotation:]
Le principe même de la providence n’est jamais abandonné. [86|87] Mais il s’adjoint celui de « l’intérêt du tout ». Par là, on restreint et même, semble-t-il, on suspend les explications de détail ; en ce sens, le principe de la providence l’emporte sur ses applications concrètes1. Mais il faut bien voir que, non seulement ce principe même demeure sans faille, mais encore il continue à s’appliquer dans toute sa rigueur 2. Ce à quoi l’on renonce, ce n’est pas à affirmer cette application, c’est à l’interpréter. Dans ce refus d’interprétation, deux points sont remarquables. Tout d’abord, en suspendant l’intérêt individuel (que nous croyons comprendre, mais qui ne se réalise pas toujours) à l’intérêt du tout (qui se réalise, mais que nous ne comprenons pas toujours)3, on atteint dans [87|88] son principe même le finalisme anthropocentrique. Il est bien vrai que le monde est « le système composé des dieux et des hommes, et des choses qui se produisent dans l’intérêt de ceux-ci »1; « le monde a été fait dans l’intérêt des dieux et des hommes, et toutes les choses qu’il contient, sont préparées et conçues à l’usage des hommes »2. Dans la mesure où cette intention bienveillante des dieux se manifeste dans des institutions générales, elle nous est pleinement pénétrable ; des plantes et des bêtes, nous sommes visiblement « les propriétaires légitimes »3. Mais quand il faut rapporter à nous tel événement précis, qui trompe notre espoir et contredit nos désirs, sa finalité nous échappe, et l’interprétation ne peut invoquer, avec le principe général de la providence, que l’intérêt du tout. Dans ce refus d’interpréter, il y a, non pas un doute sur la providence, mais une critique à l’égard de nos préférences personnelles et, l’événement vient d’en faire la preuve, ignorantes. Aussi cette critique a-t-elle pour contre-partie la purification des passions et l’ascèse des désirs4.
(86-88)
1. Id., ibid., 207 (sur la providence et les maux; cf. surtout Aulu-Gelle, VII, 1, S.V.F., II, 117o) : « Il n’y a pas là le moindre dualisme ; il y a seulement, avec le principe de la prévalence des vues d’ensemble sur les détails, une espèce de casuistique de la volonté créatrice, fondée sur ce principe. »
2. Cela résulte déjà de l’identification du Destin avec la Providence. Même les 1naux sont voulus par celle-ci: les « maux ne sont pas précisément une nécessité extérieure à laquelle se plie la volonté divine » (comme, p. ex., le Démiurge du Timée), « ils ne sont pas contre nature : ils sont voulus par elle, en même temps que l’ensemble » (Bréhier, Chrysippe, p. 207). – Si certains textes mettent l’accent sur l’intérêt général, ils montrent en même temps comment celui-ci pénètre et justifie les événements particuliers : « Si les dieux ont délibéré sur moi et sur ce qui devait m’arriver, ils ont bien délibéré, car un dieu qui ne délibérerait pas, ce n’est même pas facile à concevoir... Que s’ils n’ont pas délibéré sur moi en particulier, de toute façon ils ont délibéré sur l’intérêt général, et, comme ce qui m’arrive en est aussi une conséquence, je dois bien l’accueillir et m’en déclarer satisfait » (M.-Aurèle, VI, 44, 3) ; faut-il rendre Zeus responsable, si sa foudre frappe l’innocent ? « Fulmina non mittia Ioue, sed sic omnia esse disposita ut etiam quae ab illo non fiunt tamen sine ratione non fiant, quae illius est. Na1n etiamsi Iupiter illa nunc non facit, Iupiter fecit ut fierent. Singulis non adest ad omne, sed manmn et uim et causam omnibus dedit » (Sénèque, Quest. Nat., II, XLVI). On voit comment, de l’affirmation de l’intérêt général, on pouvait glisser vers la concession : « Ne in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant » (p. 85, n. I). Mais de même qu’un seul événement se produisant sans cause, romprait, avec l’enchaînement du destin, l’unité du monde (p. 83, n. 8), de même aucune contingence ne peut s’introduire dans l’ordre de la providei1ce. (Selon Chrysippe, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστόν ἔστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὴν Διὸς βούλησιν. Plut., de comm. not., 34, 1076 e = S.V.F., II, 937.) Par où l’on voit déjà (cf. la suite de notre texte) comment la causalité prévaut sur la finalité; c’est tout ensemble au destin et à la providence, que s’appliquerait cette phrase de Bergson sur la « philosophie mécanistique » : « Il faudrait la laisser, si le plus petit grain de poussière, en déviant de la trajectoire prévue par la mécanique, manifestait la plus légère trace de spontanéité » (Evol. Créatr., p. 43).
3. Cf. Epictète, Diss., II, V, 25 : « Qu’es-tu ? Un homme. Si tu te considères comme un membre isolé, il est selon la nature de viv1e jusqu’à un âge avancé, de s’enrichir, de se bien porter. Mais si tu te considères comme un homme et comme partie d’un certain tout, c’est dans l’intérêt de ce tout que tu dois tantôt subir la maladie, tantôt entreprendre une traversée et courir des risques, tantôt supporter la pauvreté et parfois même mourir avant l’heure » ; et le texte de Chrysippe, cité ibid., II, VII, 9-10 : « Tant que les conséquences restent pour moi obscures, je m’attache toujours à ce qui est plus apte à me procurer les biens conformes à la nature, car Dieu même, en me créant, m’en a laissé le libre choix. Mais si je savais vraiment que la maladie a été décrétée pour moi maintenant par le Destin, c’est avec la même ferveur que je l’accepterais. »
(87)
1. Diog. Laërt., VII, 138.
2. Cic., de nat. deor., II, LXII, 154.
3. Id., ibid., II, LXIII, 157.
4. C’est ce qu’Eplctète appelle le premier thème philosophique (p. ex. Diss., I, IV, II; III, II; III, XII).
(88)
[Providence without Divination. Knowledge of Particular Causes without Knowledge of Particular Ends]
(p.88: “ En second lieu, si l’on renonce à interpréter la providence …”)
[In sum: So under this view, we still affirm providence, but we also acknowledge that we can only know the general ends of particular events but not the specific ends, in terms of the precise role they play in attaining that greater good. However, with this in mind, we can still look to the causes of events.]
[The second thing we note is that if we renounce the interpretation of providence (possibly, if we no longer see providence as something completely divinable) then we continue still to affirm providence while still being unable to fully understand any specific event in terms of all that is involved in it. The event here bears the sign of its finality (maybe, its service to the good of the whole, or at least the particular role it plays in the larger picture), which is precisely why it had to happen. And if we are unable to see what that specific end is, at least we can know its cause. (This previous point is important but I did not catch it. It might be the following. We do not know how exactly an event plays a role in the greater good, but we know that the reason what happened before it was to bring about this event, also for the greater good. Or, we simply just see the efficient causality of some event, while we do not see the final end, even though we can believe it to be the greater good.) Thus the concealed finality refers us back to causality.]
En second lieu, si l’on renonce à interpréter la providence, on n’en continue pas moins à l’affirmer, et cela au sujet de cet événement précisément, qu’on ne parvient pas à comprendre. L’événement, ici, porte en lui-même le signe de sa finalité, en ceci seul qu’il arrive. Et si nous ignorons en vue de quelle fin (pourtant certaine) il se produit, au moins en connaissons-nous, souvent5, la cause. La finalité cachée nous renvoie ainsi à la causalité.
(88)
5. Sauf dans le cas du prétendu hasard (τύχη) qui doit se comprendre comme une αἰτία ἀπρονόητος καὶ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ (Plut., de fato, 7, 572 a ; cf. Aëtius, I, 29, 7, Dox. Gr., p. 326= S.V.F., II, 966). – Cette définition qui remonte sans doute à Anaxagore ou à Démocrite (Aëtius, loc. cit. ; Vors6., 59 (46), A, 66; 68 (55), A, 70) est déjà mentionnée par Aristote, Phys., B, 4, 196 b 5.
(88)
From:
Goldschmidt, Victor. 1953. Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps. Paris: Vrin.
Otherwise:
Marcus Aurelius. 2014. Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Translated by Hutcheson, Francis and Moor, James. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Text copied from:
.
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