26 Feb 2017

Luhtala (5.5.4.0) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “The Component of Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Anneli Luhtala

 

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

 

Ch.5 The Stoics

 

5.5 Stoic Logic

 

5.5.4.0

The Component of Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)

 

 

Brief summary:

For the Stoics, meaning (σημαινόμενα) is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν). The sayable is the incorporeal, rational component of some situation in the world, that is to say, it is a state of affairs. Also, it is the propositional sense of a statement expressing that state of affairs, taking the form of either a full proposition with both a subject and a predicate or a bare predicate without a subject. There are two important definitions the Stoics give for the predicate: {1} it is a state of affairs construed around one or more subjects, or {2} it is a defective sayable which has to be joined to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement.

 

 

 

Summary

 

5.5.4.0.1

[For the Stoics, meaning (σημαινόμενα) is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν), which is the incorporeal, rational component – the state of affairs – of some situation in the world, and it is as well the propositional sense of a statement corresponding to that state of affairs, taking the form of either a full proposition with both a subject and a predicate or a bare predicate without a subject.]

 

Diogenes Laertius explains the Stoic notion of meaning (σημαινόμενα). It is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν). The sayable (λεκτόν) is something that “subsists in accordance with a rational presentation,” and it can hold either in a full proposition or in a simple predicate. When there is both subject and predicate, it is a complete sayable, and when it is a predicate without a subject, it is an incomplete sayable. The predicate is what is said of something or it is a state of affairs involving one or more subjects. [Please consult the quotation to follow. This seems to imply that a state of affairs is not something corporeal. Maybe we might be able to say the following. We say that the tree is green. There is a state of affairs, the tree’s being green. Its greenness, as a quality, is corporeal. But the tree’s being green, its having of this predicate, is incorporeal. It is something rational about the world, and it is also the sense of the statement describing that situation in the world.]

Diogenes Laertius introduces the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) as follows:

The topic which deals with states of affairs (πράγματα) and significations (σημαινόμενα) includes that of sayables (λεκτά), both those that are complete and propositions and syllogisms, and those which are incomplete, and active and passive predicates. They say that a sayable (λεκτόν) is what subsists in accordance with a rational presentation. Sayables, the Stoics say, are divided into complete and incomplete, the latter being ones whose expression is unfinished. Those are defective the expression of which is unfinished, e.g. ‘writes’, for we ask, ‘Who?’ In complete sayables the expression is finished, e.g. ‘Socrates writes.’ So incomplete sayables include predicates, whereas ones that are complete include propositions, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries. (Diog. Laert. VII,63, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 196)142

The theory of sayables (λεκτά) belongs to the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα). The notion of sayable (λεκτόν) as described above covers predicates and propositions but the nominal part of the proposition is not specified in these terms. Diogenes Laertius quotes the following definitions of the predicate as pertaining to Stoic propositional analysis:

(1) the predicate is what is said of something (το κατά τινος &γοpευό­ μενον) or (2) the predicate is a state of affairs construed around one or more subjects (πρᾶγμα συντακτὸν περί τινος ἢ τινῶν), according to Apollodorus, or (3) the predicate is a defective sayable which has to be joined to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement (λεκτὸν ἐλλιπὲς συντακτὸν ὀρθῇ πτώσει πρὸς ἀξιώματος γένεσιν). (Diog. Laert. VII,64)143

| These definitions are followed by different classifications of the predicate which will be discussed below.

142. Ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν σημαινομένων τόπῳ τέτακται ὁ περὶ λεκτῶν καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιωμάτων καὶ συλλογισμῶν λόγος καὶ ὁ περὶ ἐλλιπῶν τε καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ ὀρθῶν καὶ ὑπτίων. Φασὶ δὲ (τὸ) λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶναι αὐτοτελῆ οἱ Στωικοί, τὰ δ᾽ ἐλλιπῆ. ἐλλιπῆ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφοράν, οἷον Γράφει: ἐπιζητοῦμεν γάρ, Τίς; αὐτοτελῆ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπηρτισμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφοράν, οἷον Γράφει Σωκράτης. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἐλλιπέσι λεκτοῖς τέτακται τὰ κατηγορήματα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς αὐτοτελέσι τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐρωτήματα καὶ τὰ πύσματα. [Following Perseus]

143. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ κατηγόρημα τὸ κατά τινος ἀγορευόμενον ἢ πρᾶγμα συντακτὸν περί τινος ἢ τινῶν, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἀπολλόδωρόν φασιν, ἢ λεκτὸν ἐλλιπὲς συντακτὸν ὀρθῇ πτώσει πρὸς ἀξιώματος γένεσιν. τῶν δὲ κατηγορημάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι συμβάματα, οἷον τὸ διὰ πέτρας πλεῖν. καὶ τὰ μέν ἐστι τῶν κατηγορημάτων ὀρθά, ἃ δ᾽ ὕπτια, ἃ δ᾽ οὐδέτερα. ὀρθὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ συντασσόμενα μιᾷ τῶν πλαγίων πτώσεων πρὸς κατηγορήματος γένεσιν, οἷον Ἀκούει, Ὁρᾷ, Διαλέγεται: ὕπτια δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ | συντασσόμενα τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ, οἷον Ἀκούομαι, Ὁρῶμαι: οὐδέτερα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ μηδετέρως ἔχοντα, οἷον Φρονεῖ, Περιπατεῖ. ἀντιπεπονθότα δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ὑπτίοις, ἃ ὕπτια ὄντα ἐνεργήματα (δέ) ἐστιν, οἷον Κείρεται. [Following Perseus]

(86-87)

 

 

 

5.5.4.0.2

[As evinced in their variety of definitions for propositions, there is diversity in the Stoic approach to the predicate.]

 

[Recall from above that Diogenes Laertius gave the following three definitions for “predicate” in Stoic philosophy: (1) the predicate is what is said of something or (2) the predicate is a state of affairs construed around one or more subjects, according to Apollodorus, or (3) the predicate is a defective sayable which has to be joined to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement.] We can infer from the fact that there are three definitions for the predicate that it was a prominent element in the Stoic proposition and also that there was notable diversity in their approach to propositions. Luhtala sees these as three different definitions [perhaps meaning that they do not overlap in their meanings.] However, the first definition does not reflect distinctly Stoic concerns, while the second two do. Luhtala “will argue that both manifestly Stoic defnitions are applicable to constructions involving two nominals, which was a novelty in the tradition of propositional analysis” (87).

 

 

From:

 

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

 

 

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

 

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

The Perseus Greek page for the Diogenes’ passages:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0257%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

The Perseus English page for the Diogenes’ passages:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

 

 

Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

 

 

 

 

This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:

http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/04/stoic-logic-and-semantics-554-component.html

 

 

.

Luhtala (5.5.3) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “Parts of Speech”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Stoicism, entry directory]

[Anneli Luhtala, entry directory]

[Luhtala, Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, entry directory]

 

[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Anneli Luhtala

 

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

 

Ch.5 The Stoics

 

5.5 Stoic Logic

 

5.5.3

Parts of Speech 

 

 

Brief summary:

The Stoic’s identified five parts of speech: {1} ὄνομα (proper noun),{2} προσηγορία (common noun), {3} ῥῆμα (verb), {4} σύνδεσμοσ (conjunction), and {5} ἄρθρον (pronoun). By distinguishing proper noun, common noun, and pronoun, the Stoics were able to analyze propositions in terms of degrees of definiteness of the reference to the subject. A name or proper noun (ὄνομα) signifies an individual quality, for example, “Diogenes,” “Socrates.” A common noun (προσηγορία) signifies a common quality, for example “man” and “horse.”  A verb (ῥῆμα) signifies a simple predicate attaching to a subject, for example, “I write” and “I speak”. And a pronoun points out a mere substance. The definition of the verb is special among the parts of speech, because it refers to the syntactical role the part plays. [The nominal parts make no reference to how that part relates to the other parts so to form a larger sentential unit with complex meaning, while the verb does do that, because it is said to attach to a subject.] For the subject to play a syntactical role and not just a grammatical one, that is, for it to designate a part of the proposition rather than simply a part of speech, it needs to be inflected, and thus its syntactical role is a matter of case (πτῶσις). Since the nominal parts refer to physical things in the world, they have a corporeal reference, but since verbs do not refer to physical things, they have an incorporeal reference. Substances and qualities belong to the four Stoic categories or genera: {1} ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate), {2} ποιόν (quality / qualified), {3} πως ἔχοv (disposition / disposed), and {4} πρός τί πως ἔχον (relative disposition / relatively disposed). For something to belong to the first Stoic category, ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate) simply means for it to have the attribute of existing as a material object, without mention of its own qualities. Substance mixes with qualities, which are air currents and which, as corporeal, affect the substance. There are two stages to a substance being qualified: commonly and peculiarly.  Commonly qualified substance corresponds to the common noun, peculiarly qualified substance corresponds to the proper noun, and mere (unqualified) substance, although an impossibility in actuality, corresponds to the pronoun. Some confusions can result from the Stoic’s notion of the corporeality of verbal expressions. Since as expression as  physical event is corporeal, and since what it stands for is corporeal, we might regard the two corporeal bodies as the same thing, as with Chrysippus’s claim that when we say “wagon,” an actual wagon passes through our lips. Parts of speech serve their representational function either by pointing out or showing their reference (δηλοῦν) or by signifying it (σημαίνειν). Verbs signify either their predicate or something about the subject. Proper nouns and pronouns point out an individual quality. However, common nouns signify common qualities. They do not point out their reference, like proper nouns and pronouns do, because common nouns are not specific like these others are. Nouns and verbs, in their raw form [undeclined and infinitive] are mere parts of speech, and they do not refer to components of meaning in a proposition. However, when they are combined and modified such that the nouns have case and the verbs have finite conjugation, then they have syntactical relations and thus can refer to parts of a proposition’s meaning. Nouns, when declined, refer both to a corporeal reality, namely, the substance or quality, and to an incorporeal reality, namely, the specific subject of a proposition. Verbs, however, do not refer to any corporeal reality but only to the incorporeal meaning or sayable of the proposition’s predicate.

 photo Table 1 and 2 p.85_zpsrriq4kpf.jpg

 

 

 

Summary

 

5.5.3.1

[The Stoic’s major contribution to the doctrine of parts of speech is to have identified the following five: {1} ὄνομα (proper noun),{2} προσηγορία (common noun), {3} ῥῆμα (verb), {4} σύνδεσμοσ (conjunction), and {5} ἄρθρον (pronoun)]

 

There are five parts of speech for the Stoics: {1} ὄνομα (proper noun),{2} προσηγορία (common noun), {3} ῥῆμα (verb), {4} σύνδεσμοσ (conjunction), and {5} ἄρθρον (pronoun), with a possible sixth one, μεσότης (adverb) (78). “Five parts figure standardly as the Stoics’ contribution to the development of the doctrine of the parts | of speech in later accounts in which Aristotle is said to have established two parts, noun and verb (e.g. GL II: 54,5-9)” (78-79).

 

 

5.5.3.2

[The distinction of the proper noun (ὄνομα) from the common noun (προσηγορία) and from the pronoun (ἄρθρον) enabled an analysis of propositions based on degrees of definiteness of the reference to the subject.]

 

“The Stoics distinguished the proper noun (ὄνομα) from the common noun (προσηγορία) and established the pronoun (ἄρθρον) as a separate part of speech (79). [Note, given the above division into five, the idea here seems to be that the proper noun, the common noun, as well as the pronoun are all different parts of speech, and not that proper and common nouns are two varieties of the same part of speech.] Luhtala then explains how these particular distinctions were useful for propositional analysis:

These distinctions have obvious relevance for propositional analysis: by means of the three nominal parts of speech the Stoics were able to distinguish between more and less highly referential subjects and, consequently, different kinds of propositions in terms of their varying degrees of definiteness. The nominal parts can thus be related to the needs of propositional analysis.

(79)

 

 

5.5.3.3

[A name or proper noun (ὄνομα) signifies an individual quality, for example, “Diogenes,” “Socrates.” A common noun (προσηγορία) signifies a common quality, for example “man,” “horse.”  A verb (ῥῆμα) signifies a simple predicate attaching to a subject, for example, “I write,” “I speak”. And a pronoun points out a mere substance.]

 

Diogenes Laertius provides definitions for four parts of speech, which he attributes to Diogenes of Babylon. A common noun (προσηγορία) is a part of speech that “signifies a common quality,” with such examples as “man” and “horse”. A name (proper noun / ὄνομα) is a part of speech that “points out an individual quality,” with such examples as “Diogenes” and Socrates”. A verb (ῥῆμα) is a part of speech that “signifies a simple predicate or [...] an uninflected element of a sentence signfiying something that can be attached to one or more (subjects),” with such examples as “I write” and “I speak”. A conjunction is “an uninflected part of speech uniting parts of speech” (79, quoting Diogenes Laertius VII,58). What is missing here of course is the definition of pronoun (ἄρθρον). It probably comes after Diogenes of Babylon, but Apollonius Dyscolus likely preserved it: a “pronoun points out mere substance” (οὀσίαν τε μόνον δηλοῦσιν) (80, citing, GG II.1: 9,9; see Pinborg1975: 99 and p. 114-115).

 

 

5.5.3.4

[The definition of the verb is special among the others, because it refers to the syntactical role the part plays.]

 

Luhtala then notes a crucial difference in how a verb is defined compared to the other parts of speech. In the definitions of all the nominal parts, there is no reference to the syntactical role the part plays in the sentence. In the verb’s definition, however, the part is understood in terms of its syntactical role as the predicate. [The difference might be the following. The nominal parts make no reference to how that part relates to the other parts so to form a larger sentential unit with complex meaning, while the verb does.] As we saw, the verb is defined in two ways: {1} as a simple predicate, and {2} “as something that can be construed with one or more subjects. The latter definition can be associated with the definition of the predicate according to which the predicate signifes a state of affairs (πρᾶγμα) which occurs in a construction about one or more subjects” (80).

 

 

5.5.3.5

[In Stoic logic, the notion of subject refers to nominal inflection, even though we would normally consider this a grammatical issue.]

 

There is a debate regarding how the subject operates in Stoic logic [as opposed to just Stoic grammar], but it “is generally taken to be represented by case (πτῶσις). Luhtala will return to this matter later, but she for now states that subject refers to nominal inflection. While nominal inflection might seem to be merely a grammatical issue, it in fact belongs to the sphere of meaning (σημαινόμενα) (80).

 

 

5.5.3.6

[Nominal parts of speech have a corporeal reference, verbs an incorporeal reference.]

 

Since nominal parts of speech are defined without reference to syntactical features, but verbs are, that must mean that they signify ontologically different items (80-81). Since the nominal parts refer to physical things in the world, they have a corporeal reference, but since verbs do not refer to physical things, they have an incorporeal reference.

The difference between the descriptions of the verb and the nominal parts of speech – with the presence or absence of ‘syntactical’ features in their respective definitions – must somehow reflect the fact that they | signify ontologically different items respectively. Nouns and pronouns are related to bodies (σώματα) in the material world, whereas there is nothing in the material world that corresponds to the contents of the verb. According to Stoic physics, only bodies really exist; both substances and qualities were understood by the Stoics as corporeal. What the verb stands for pertains solely to the sphere of thinking and speaking, that is to the component of meaning (σημαινόμενον, λεκτόν). The essence of the verb is its syntactico-semantic role, which is to say something about bodies. The distinction between the nominal parts of speech and the verb would seem to reflect the division of Stoic ontology so that the nominal parts of speech stand for corporeality (σώματα) in the ontological scheme, while the verb stands for the incorporeal items (ἀσώματα). The sayable (λεκτόν) is one of the four incorporeals posited by the Stoics (see p. 117) .

(80-81)

 

 

 

5.5.3.7

[Substances and qualities belong to the four Stoic categories or genera: {1} ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate), {2} ποιόν (quality / qualified), {3} πως ἔχοv (disposition / disposed), and {4} πρός τί πως ἔχον (relative disposition / relatively disposed). ]

 

[I am not exactly sure what Luhtala means in the following:] “But the exact status of substances and qualities, in terms of which the nominal parts are defined, is unclear” (81). Nonetheless, we at least know about the Stoic categories or genera that substances and qualities belong to: {1} ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate), {2} ποιόν (quality / qualified), {3} πως ἔχοv (disposition / disposed), and {4} πρός τί πως ἔχον (relative disposition / relatively disposed). Luhtala

will now briefly introduce the first two categories following closely their description by Long and Sedley, according to whom “the four genera are a classification of the metaphysical aspects under which a body can be viewed.”133

133. They were actually never called ‘categories’ in our sources a Long and Sedley observe. They prefer to use the term genera (Long/Sedley 1987: 165, and 172-174).

(81)

 

 

5.5.3.8

[For something to belong to the first Stoic category, ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate) simply means for it to have the attribute of existing as a material object, without mention of its own qualities. Substance mixes with qualities, which are air currents and which, as corporeal, affect the substance. There are two stages to a substance being qualified: commonly and peculiarly.]

 

[The first category is ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate)]. To belong to the first category means that we are simply “attributing existence to a material object without mentioning its qualities;” as such, “it can be described as a substance, primary matter or ‘substrate’ (ὀuσία, ὑποχείμενον)” (81). [Recall some related notions from Sambursky’s Physics of the Stoics. (From section 1.1:) The Stoics held that the cosmos is a continuous whole surrounded by a void. The continuity of the whole is a dynamic continuity resulting from a cohering activity of a very rarified substrate called pneuma. (From section 1.2:) Pneuma’s function is two-fold: it both coheres the parts of a thing and it also serves as a field carrying the properties of the thing. ... Hexis is what organizes the parts of inorganic objects, like physis for plants and psyche for animals. Here the units of the thing are not merely the parts but rather the different properties of the thing, which interpenetrate such that a change in one leads to a change in the others, as a result of the “sympathy” holding between the properties. But if it is the same thing, namely, pneuma, that carries the properties of various things, then how do we explain why different things have different properties? In Sambursky’s interpretation, a hexis of a thing is composed of many pneumata, one for each property. What differentiates the pneumata is that they have their own compositional ratio of mixture of Air and Fire. All such pneumata are combined in the thing but without each losing its own identity, hence their particular properties are expressed. But these pneumata are connected as well such that a change in one creates a change in the others. (From section 1.3:) Pneumata combine with substantial parts, binding them together, to compose whole things and to provide them with their qualities. We can characterize the sort of mixture pneumata make with physical parts as being a special kind of mixture that the Stoics invented. ... (namely) {3} Mixtures proper (krasis for liquids and mixis for non-liquids), where the components interpenetrate entirely and thoroughly such that there is no mosaic-like distribution on the smallest scale. Yet somehow despite this constituent homogeneity, each part retains its own properties and can be separated out again. This is the sort of mixture pneumata make with the other physical parts of a thing so to form its hexis. (From section 1.4:) The Stoics held that all things can be metaphysically classified under four hierarchical categories, all of which fall under the concept of the something. In their consecutive order they are: substratum, quality, state, and relative state. The fourth category is divided into two subcategories. {a} A relative state, which is defined by something outside it, like the father-son relation. And {b} a relative, which is something capable of undergoing change between states by matters of degree that are measure by comparing the two states, like being at a level of two degrees of sweetness compared to bitterness. A hexis is an example of a relative, because it is comprised of pneumata that each express a quality such that a continuous variation in the composition of the pneuma will result in a continuous variation in its quality. The four categories fit within the Stoic theory of the dynamic continuum. The substratum is the pneuma which binds the parts of all things and which endows them with qualities. The qualities are determined by the (physical) states of the pneuma, which are always in relative states, given that they are constantly under variation as their pneumata alter their compositions.] [A thing’s qualities are also corporeal, as they are constituted by pneuma or “currents of air”. These corporeal qualities mix with the substance. In Sambursky’s account, given above, the idea is that the qualities are constituted by pneuma, which is composed of a mixture of Air and Fire. Depending on the ratio of Air to Fire (the active elements), a particular quality will be constituted. As well as expressing this quality, the pneuma mixture also performs a binding action, cohering the substantial parts of the object, which are composed of units of Earth and Water (the passive elements). So we can say that an individual thing consists of two corporeal substrates: {1} substance (composed of Earth and Water) and quality (composed of pneuma, which is Air and Fire). Luhtala furthermore says that neither substrate nor quality can exist in isolation, but I am not sure why. Perhaps it is because the pneuma would dissipate if it did not have substantial parts to cohere, and the substantial parts would dissipate if they did not have pneuma to cohere them. That is a guess. She lastly says that qualified substance has two stages: commonly qualified and peculiarly qualified. This is elaborated in the next paragraph.]

Belonging to the first category means that we are attributing existence to a material object without mentioning its qualities; it can be described as a substance, primary matter or ‘substrate’ (ὀuσία, ὑποχείμενον). It necessarily mixes with qualities, which being corporeal (see, e.g. Simpl. In Ar. cat. 217,32-218, 1 = SVF 2 .389 and In Ar. cat. 271,20-2 = SVF 2.383), are able to affect it causally. Qualities were generally understood by the Stoics as currents of air shaping the substance.134 Α qualifed substance is, for instance, a prudent individual (φρόνιμος) (Simpl. In Ar. cat. 212,12-213,1 = SVF 2.390). It is thus that the Stoics understood an in- | dividual as consisting of two substrates, substance and quality (see Plut. Comm. not. 1083Α-1084Α and Porph. ap. Simpl. In Ar. cat. 48, 11-16), which were both corporeal. Any individual object is a mixture of substance and quality, neither of which can exist in isolation. Moreover, the characteristic of being a qualified substance exhibits two stages, namely commonly and peculiarly qualified.

134. This is, according to Simplicius, Chrysippus’s view (In Ar. cat. 217,32-218,1 = SVF 2.389).

(81-82)

 

 

 

5.5.3.9

[Commonly qualified substance corresponds to the common noun, peculiarly qualified substance corresponds to the proper noun, and mere (unqualified) substance, although an impossibility in actuality, corresponds to the pronoun.]

 

[The first category is ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate) and the second is ποιόν (quality / qualified).]  There are linguistic equivalents for the first two categories. [Recall that substances have two stages of qualification, common and peculiar.] The common noun corresponds with commonly qualified substance, and the proper noun with peculiarly qualified substance. Now, although substances cannot exist apart from qualities, pure substance can still be designated with the pronoun.

The linguistic equivalents of the two first categories are quite clear: they are represented by the three nominal parts of speech.135 The common noun signifies ‘commonly qualified’, the proper noun ‘peculiarly qualified’ and the pronoun expresses pure ‘substance’. Curiously, although substances cannot exist in the real world separately from qualities, it seems to be possible to separate these aspects linguistically and point, by means of the pronoun, to a mere substance.

[Footnote 135 is about the possibility of relating “disposition (or disposed) (πως έχον) and relative disposition (or relatively disposed) (rφός τί πως έχον) to linguistic description, namely to ‘intransitive’ and ‘transitive’ verbs respectively” (82).]

(82)

 

 

5.5.3.10

[Insofar as a part of speech is given as a verbal expression, it is corporeal (because it is physically spoken), and at the same time, it represents a corporeal thing too. This leads to confusions when we take the corporeal expression itself to be the same as the corporeal thing it represents. Also, anything that can be a noun is corporeal.]

 

Luhtala will now make some comments on the Stoic parts of speech. {1} The parts of speech [as verbal expressions] are corporeal. Additionally, what they represent are corporeal things too. [It seems that one confusion this can create is that since both the signifier and the signified are corporeal, and since they both correspond directly with or actually are some given thing, then we might confuse the corporeal expression for a thing with the corporeal thing itself, as in Chrysippus’ example of saying “wagon” and thereby an actual wagon passes through your lips.]

The Stoic parts of speech call forth a number o f comments. There is a curious ambivalence in the corporeality of the nominal parts of speech in that they are, as such, corporeal expressions and they signify something that is corporeal, substances and qualities. This ambivalence has probably given rise to some sophisms.136

136. For instance, εἴ τι λαλεῖς, τοῦτο διὰ τοῦ στόματός σου διέρχεται: ἅμαξαν δὲ λαλεῖς. ἅμαξα ἄρα διὰ τοῦ στόματός σου διέρχεται (“Ίf you say something, it passes through your lips: now you say ‘wagon’, consequently a wagon passes through your lips” Diog. Laert. VII,187); cf. Clemens (Strom. VIII,9,26,5, p. 97,3-7). For sophisms, see Ebbesen (1981: 23 f.).

(82)

{2} It would seem then that anything which takes the form of a noun was understood by the Stoics as corporeal. However, we have a different concept of nounness today (82-83).

 

 

5.5.3.11

[Parts of speech serve their representational function either by pointing out or showing their reference (δηλοῦν) or by signifying it (σημαίνειν). Verbs signify either their predicate or something about the subject. Proper nouns and pronouns point out an individual quality. However, common nouns signify common qualities. They do not point out their reference, like proper nouns and pronouns do, because common nouns are not specific like these others are.]

 

The parts of speech serve some representative function. There are two verbs for this function: {1} δηλοῦν, “to point out” or “to show”, and {2} σημαίνειν, “to signify” (83). The different parts of speech are said to refer in accordance with this distinction. Proper nouns point out (δηλοῦν) an individual quality and pronouns point out (δηλοῦν) a mere substance. Common nouns signify (σημαίνειν) common qualities. Verbs signify (σημαίνειν) either the predicate or “something that is construed around one or more subjects” (83). [The next idea seems to be that the reason common nouns signify while proper nouns and pronouns point out or show their referents is that in propositions, proper nouns and pronouns specify some particular thing while common nouns are not specific.] (83)

Concerning their terminology, a question arises, whether the Stoics differentiated their use of the verbs δηλοῦν (‘to point out’, ‘to show’) and σημαίνειν (‘to signify’) in defining the parts of speech. The proper noun and the pronoun are said to point out (δηλοῦν) individual quality and mere substance respectively, whereas the common noun is said to signify (σημαίνειν) common quality. The verb is said to signify (σημαίνειν) the predicate or something that is construed around one or more subjects. The use of δηλοῦν in the case of proper nouns and pronouns could be due to the fact that subjects are normally represented by these items in the Stoic propositions. The ‘meaning’ of these parts is thus different in that it immediately reveals the definite referent of the proposition. Such common nouns as ‘man’ and ‘horse’ as well as verbs do not reveal anything that is so clearly identifiable. Common nouns thus do not figure prominently in the Stoic propositional analysis in which statements are made about definite individuals.139

139 The role played by universals (represented by common nouns such a ‘man’ and ‘horse’) in the Stoic proposition remains obscure to me. According to Zeno, they are nonexistent (ἀνυτάρκτους, SVF 1.65); they are neither corporeals nor incorporeals in the Stoic ontological scheme. According to Long & Sedley, talk of universals like ‘man’, though legitimate, must be understood a being reducible to talk of token men (1987: 164). Accordingly, the definition “man is a rational mortal animal” (ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν was analyzed by the Stoics as “If something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal” (Adv. math. ΧΙ,8-11 = S VF 2.224). See also Ebbesen (1988: 27-28).

But according to Sextus Empiricus, ‘man’ and ‘horse’ represent corporeal things which can affect the commanding-faculty (ἡγεμονικὸν) just like other bodies (Adv. math. VIII,409 = SVF 2.85). According to Plutarch, too, they are bodies, together with heaven, earth and stones (Plut. De comm. not. 1073D).

Common nouns (e.g. ‘man’) appear in sophisms, a quoted by Galen, for instance (De soph. 4 = S VF 2.153).

 

 

 

5.5.3.12

[Nouns as simple parts of speech are not syntactical units (that is, they do not contribute directly to the meaning of a proposition) until they are modified by case.]

 

[Luhtala returns to the notion of “syntactical force”. This was something we examined in section 5.5.2.5. I was not sure then what this term means, and I am still not sure. What we said before was that it might have something to do with the fact that you can have parts of speech that when taken in their raw form and then combined, like a noun and a verb, may form a sentence on the level of expression but they do not form a proposition on the level of meaning. Perhaps what is required are modifications in the noun’s case for example, which would designate certain conceptual relations that would help form a propositional concept. I am guessing.]

I have viewed the parts of speech as non-syntactical units in the component of expression (σημαίνοντα) claiming that syntactic force is assigned to them only in the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα). There is surely a problem in presenting nouns and verbs without syntactical force. The problem is less marked in the description of the noun and the pronoun: the examples are given in the nominative case which is readily understood as the most neutral form although a nominal in the nominative case is a syntactically valid item as such. But it is difficult to see how the problem could have been solved without resorting to abstract forms of representation, which the Stoics did not do. There is, however, some evidence that the noun as such was understood as a generic noun, that is without case, in which its syntactical force resides. This evidence, which is provided by Apollonius Dyscolus, will be discussed below (see p. 105-106).

(84)

 

 

 

5.5.3.13

[The infinitive form of the verb is the non-syntactical part of speech, while its finite declension stands for the predicate of a sayable.]

 

[The verb in its infinitive form would also be a non-syntactical part of speech, while its modified finite version could adequately stand for a predicate of a sayable. Please consult the quotation to follow to be sure.]

As to the verb, one could argue that the infinitive should adequately represent the verb (ῥῆμα) as a non-syntactical part of speech, while the finite verb would properly stand for the predicate in the component of sayables.140  What we find is that the verb is defined as a predicate and the examples are given in the finite form or in the infinitive. But again Apollonius Dyscolus fulfils my expectation in saying that the infinitives were called verbs (ῥῆματα) by the Stoics while such indicative forms as περιπατεῑ (‘walks’) and γράφει  (‘writes’) were regarded as predicates (κατηγόρηματα or σύμβαματα GG IL: 43,15-16).141

140. Cf. Schmidt (1979: 69): “Rhema, jedes Verbum, insofern es für sich betrachtet wird und aus allem Satzzusammenhang herausgenommen ist. Obgleich diese Bezeichnung mehr ... für Infinitiv geeignet.”

141. Evidence to the contrary would seem to be provided by Ammonius, according to whom the Stoics called all the various inflectional forms of the verb ‘verbs’/’predicates’ (ῥήματα) (In de int. CAG IV,5: 45,6). This is only an apparent contradiction. Ammonius is using Peripatetic vocabulary: what was ῥῆμα for Aristotle was κατηγόρημα  for the Stoics. Cf. Hülser and Egli in Schmidt (1979: 133).

(84)

[The nouns of course stand for something corporeal. The verb, I suppose in its finite form only, stands for something incorporeal, namely, the predicate or sayable. Luhtala then notes another distinction, which I do not follow. It seems to be the following, but please consult the quotation and diagram to follow. The verb is understood as involving just one sort of relationship, namely, the relationship between the verb (as part of speech or element of expression) and predicate (as sayable or component of meaning). Nouns also have a similar such part of speech/syntax relation, namely that between noun or pronoun and case. However, the nominal parts of speech involve an additional relation, namely, that between quality or substance and noun or pronoun. (Specifically, proper and common nouns signify a quality, while the pronoun signifies a pure substance.) (I am not certain, but perhaps the nominal parts signify a corporeal reality and an incorporeal sense, while the verbs only signify incorporeal senses. I am guessing.]

The three nominal parts of speech signify corporeal items, whereas the verb stands for something that is incorporeal, the predicate, or the sayable. There is a crucial difference in the description of the nominal parts of speech as opposed to the verb, such that the former involves two relationships (quality/substance – noun/pronoun – case) whereas the latter only one (verb – predicate).

(85)

 

 photo Table 1 and 2 p.85_zpsrriq4kpf.jpg

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From:

 

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

 

 

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

 

Ammonius: In Aristotelis De Interpretatione commentarius. CAG  IV.5. Ed. by Adolf Busse. B erlin: Reimer 1897.

 

Clemens Alexandrinus: Stromata. Ed. by Otto Stählin. Die Griechischen Christlichen Schrifsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte II-III. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1960- 70.

 

Ebbesen, Sten. 1981. Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi. A Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies. 1. The Greek Tradition. Leiden: Brill.

 

[Note, I could not find the text for Ebbesen 1988 in the bibliography.]

 

[Note, I did not see Galen’s De Soph. in the Bibliography list. Perhaps it is a part of the text that is listed:

Galen. Gelaeni de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. Edition, translation and Commentary by Phillip de Lacy. Corpus Medicorum Graecorum. V.4.1.2. Berlin: Academie-Verlag 1978-80.

]

 

GG: Grammatici Graeci . Ed. by Heinrich Schneider and Gustav Uhlig. Leipzig: Teubner (repr 1965 Hildesheim: Olms).

 

GL: Grammatici Latini . Ed by Heinrich Keil. Leipzig: Teubner 1855-80.

 

Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Pinborg, Jan. 1975. “Classical Antiquity: Greece”. Seboek (1975: 69-126).

 

Plutarch: De virtute morali in Plutarchi Moralia III. Ed. by W.R. Paton, M. Pohlenz and W. Sieveking. Leipzig: Teubner 1972.

 

Plutach: De Stoicis repugnantiis and De communibus notitiis contra Stoicos in Plutarchi Moralia V.1 .2. Ed. by Ma Pohlenz. Leipzig: Teubner 1972.

 

Schmidt, Rudolf Τ . 1979. Stoicorum grammatica. Halle 1839. (Reprinted Amsterdam: Hakkert 1967 = Die Grammatik der Stoiker. Einführung, Übersetzung und Bearbeitung von Karlheinz Hίlser, Urs Egli, Braunschweig, Wiesbaden 1979.].

 

Simplicius: In Arstotelis Categoras Commentarium. CAG VIII. Ed. by Carl Kalbfleisch. Berlin: Reimer 1907.

 

Clemens Alexandrinus: Stromata. Ed. by Otto Stählin. Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte II-III. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1960-70.

 

Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.

 

SVF: Stoicorum veterum fragmenta I-III. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1905-24.

 

 

 

 

This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:

http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/04/stoic-logic-and-semantics-parts-of.html

 

 

.

8 Feb 2017

Luhtala (5.5.2) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “The Components of Expression (Σημαίνοντα) and Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Anneli Luhtala

 

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

 

Ch.5 The Stoics

 

5.5 Stoic Logic

 

5.5.2

The Components of Expression (Σημαίνοντα) and Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)

 

 

Brief summary:

Stoic dialectic has two parts. Generally speaking, there is a part that lies on the level of language itself and a part that deals more with the conceptual meanings the language expresses. Specifically, the two parts are: {1} “expression,” equivalent to σημαίνοντα (that which signifies), to φωναι (vocal sounds), and to λέξις (word), and {2} “meaning” or “sayables,” equivalent to σημαινόμενα (that which is signified, meaning), and to λεκτά (sayables). The study of expression examines a heterogeneous set of related issues, including written utterances, parts of speech, poetry, definitions, and other various topics. The study of meaning, however, examines a more homogeneous set of logical sorts of issues, like propositions, sense (sayables), predicates, genera and species, arguments, and states of affairs. With regard to expression, ὄνομα means ‘noun’ and ῥῆμα means ‘verb’. With regard to meaning, these terms correspond with πτῶσις (case) and κατηγόρημα (predicate), respectively. Simple parts of speech, like nouns or verbs alone, are not able to take on truth values. This is only possible for sayables, which can be articulated in a propositional formulation, and thus truth and falsity are also matters of syntax, which is the meaningful combination of parts of speech. So “Dion” does not express a sayable, and it cannot be either true or false; however, “Dion walks” does and can, because its syntax allows it to represent a state of affairs in the world. Regarding the articulation of meaning, we arrange the relevant concepts in an order going from the most to the least conforming to the rational organization of the world. The world itself operates rationally, on account of its rational principle, λόγος. States of affairs (πράγματα) in the world thus have a rational sense to them, which is their sayable (λεκτόν). The verbal articulation that can adequately express the λόγος of the λεκτόν and thus of the πράγματα is also called a λόγος, but this time meaning an intelligible, articulate sentence. A step down from that is a λέξις, which is an articulate sound that might not even be intelligible, as with the famous example of “blituri”. Next down is  a φωνή, which is a sound that may not even be articulate (that is, might not even resemble a word with composite letters or phonetics).  There are two related sorts of speech acts: προφέρεσθαι (uttering), which is associated with the linguistic item φωναί (vocal sounds), and {2} λέγειν (speaking), which is assocated with πράγματα (states of affairs) and thus also with λεκτά (sayables). As we noted, while λέξις can represent a word for a real thing, it lacks the syntactical powers to represent a state of affairs. This is because real situations in the world have certain ontological properties that require more sophisticated syntactical mechanisms to be expressed. For example, the relation between a thing and its properties cannot be represented simply in a word but rather requires a syntax with a subject-predicate structure. Now, the sense of a state of affairs as the sayable (λεκτόν) is something incorporeal. However, as soon as it is vocally articulated into a propositional sentence, it has thereby taken on a corporeal form, because speech is corporeal, as it produces effects in the world. There is still another terminological distinction that divides meaning and expression into three units: 1} a corporeal sound (φωνήν), which is a signifier (σημαῖνον) {2} the corporeal sound’s ‘signification’ (σημαινόμενον), which lies in the intellect and is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν) and is thus incorporeal, and {3} the referent (τυγχάνον), which is the physical object in the world corresponding to the signification and is thus corporeal.

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

5.5.2.1

[There are two parts of Stoic dialectic: {1} “expression,” which is equivalent to σημαίνοντα (that which signifies) / φωναι (vocal sounds) / λέξις (word), and {2} “meaning” or “sayables,” which is equivalent to σημαινόμενα (that which is signified, meaning) / λεκτά (sayables)]

 

There are two parts of Stoic dialectic:

{1} σημαίνοντα / that which signifies (Diog. Laert. VII,62), also understood as φωναι / vocal sounds (Diog. Laert. VII,43); and

{2} σημαινόμενα / that which is signified (Diog. Laert. VII,62), also understood with the same Greek term, σημαινόμενα, but with the sense, ‘meaning’, when related to φωναι / vocal sounds (Diog. Laert. VII,43) (70).

Note that σημαινόμενον (that which is signified) is equivalent to λεκτόν (sayable) (70). We also note that sometimes the term λέξις (word) is used as a synonym for φωνή (vocal sound). [Later we see a more precise way to differentiate them.] With this in mind, Luhtala makes the following terminological distinction:

{a} “expression” = σημαίνοντα (that which signifies) / φωναι (vocal sounds) / λέξις (word)

{b} “meaning” or “sayables” = σημαινόμενα (that which is signified, meaning) / λεκτά (sayables) (70).

 

 

5.5.2.2

[The study of expression examines a heterogeneous set of related issues, including written utterances, parts of speach, poetry, definitions, and others. The study of meaning examines more logical sorts of matters, like propostions, sense (sayables), predicates, genera and species, arguments, states of affairs, and others.]

 

For Diogenes Laertius, expression is a matter of written utterances, parts of speech, and other elements of language, including poetry, euphony, definitions, and other matters (see p.70). [Meaning, however, is a matter of logical structures that can be expressed linguistically.]

According to Diogenes Laertius, the study of expression covered

written utterance and what the parts of language are, dealing also with solecisms and barbarisms, poetry, ambiguity, euphony, music, and, according to some Stoics, definitions, divisions and expressions.112

The component of meaning comprised

impressions and derivatively subsistent sayables – propositions, complete sayables, predicates and similar actives and passives, genera and species, along with also arguments, argument modes and syllogisms, and sophisms which depend on utterance and on states of affairs. (Diog. Laert. VII,43-44 , tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 183)113

112. Εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ περὶ ὅρων κατά τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων. [See Perseus 44]

113. καὶ τὸν μὲν τῶν σημαινομένων εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν ἀξιωμάτων καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρθῶν καὶ ὑπτίων καὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λόγων καὶ τρόπων καὶ συλλογισμῶν καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὰ πράγματα σοφισμάτων. [See Perseus 43]

(70)

[Recall from above that the study of expression covers “written utterance and what the parts of language are, dealing also with solecisms and barbarisms, poetry, ambiguity, euphony, music, and, according to some Stoics, definitions, divisions and expressions”. Luhtala’s next point might be that this is a very odd heterogeneous combination of things to group under one study.]

The classification of topics under these two components of dialectic by the Stoics differs considerably from the modern understanding of the divisions of disciplines and it requires a special effort to appreciate the genuinely Stoic interpretation of these topics. It is particularly difficult to get to grips with the strikingly heterogeneous contents of the component of expression. It is probably best understood in terms of its composite nature, as has been suggested by Frede.

(71)

 

 

 

5.5.2.3

[The components of meaning are more homogeneous and are related to logical structures, like subject and predicate, but for the Stoics, the syntactical analysis is more sophisticated than with Aristotle.]

 

The expression can be analyzed structurally into its component parts of speech, which were likely studied for the sake of propositional analysis. [We noted before that the study of expression involves a heterogeneous set of topics.] “The component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) is much more homogeneous, including only philosophically relevant items, such as propositions and predicates” (71). [Luhtala in the previous chapters examined syntactical studies by Plato and Aristotle. The study of parts of speech in expression will derive from naming, while the components of meaning will come from the parts of statement making. Aristotle’s study of propositions was limited to simply subjects and verbs, but the Stoics had a much more sophistical analysis.]

The component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) is much more homogeneous, including only philosophically relevant items, such as propositions and predicates. I will view this division of topics as a development of the linguistic analysis initiated by Plato and Aristotle, so that the treatment of the parts of speech in the component of expression roughly derives from the non-syntactical level of naming (ὀνομάζειν) and the component of meaning from the syntactical level of statement-making (λέγειν). In such a comparison we must keep in mind the provisional nature of the Peri hermeneias as opposed to the elaborate system of the Stoics, to whom linguistic questions were of much more importance. Aristotle merely sketched the two constituents of the proposition, ὄνομα (‘noun’ / ‘subject’) and ῥῆμα (‘verb’ / ‘predicate’), and their combination into a statement without a careful analysis of the different levels involved in statement-making. The Stoics developed an elaborate system with a highly specialized vocabulary for each level of description.

(71)

 

 

5.5.2.4

[In their analysis of expression, ὄνομα means ‘noun’ and ῥῆμα means ‘verb’. In their analysis of meaning, these terms correspond with case (πτῶσις) and predicate (κατηγόρημα), respectively.]

 

[The next point might be the following, but please check the quotation. In their analysis of expression, the Stoics considered ὄνομα to mean ‘noun’ and ῥῆμα to mean ‘verb’. In their analysis of meaning, ὄνομα corresponds to case (πτῶσις) and ῥῆμα corresponds with predicate (κατηγόρημα). This distinction is seen already in Aristotle, but the Stoics introduce additional terminology.]

While items of both levels were named ὄνομα and ῥῆμα by Aristotle, the Stoics posited a systematic terminological distinction to label the items of the two distinct levels. The Stoics maintained the well-established vocabulary of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα to refer to the noun and the verb as items of the component of expression (σημαίνοντα). I will view them as non-syntactical linguistic units in accordance with the level of naming (ὀνομάζειν) in the Peri hermeneias. Within the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα), the same items are known as case (πτῶσις) and predicate (κατηγόρημα). Both of these terms can be derived from Peripatetic usage. But the Stoics introduced many other terms into their component of meaning (σημαινόμενα), such as σύμβαμα (‘congruity’) and λεκτόν (‘sayable’), which attest to the versatility of the Stoic approach.

(72)

 

 

5.5.2.5

[Truth and falsity are not matters of grammatical parts of speech but rather of sayables and thus of syntax, which is the meaningful combination of parts of speech.]

 

The truth and falsity of statements lies in the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα). But the parts of statements, namely, cases and predicates, are not sufficient on their own to carry truth or falsity. [I am not sure about the next point. It might be the following. To combine a noun and a verb is not enough to make a statement. Perhaps it is enough to make a sentence. But what is needed are units of meaning, namely, case and predicate. She says that parts of speech do not have “syntactic force”, but I do not know what that means. Yet, given that it is needed for statements and thus for truth and falsity, syntax pertains to sayables or meaning. I do not understand how syntax is distinguishable from a study of parts of speech. Perhaps the difference is that an analysis of parts of speech is a matter of finding different grammatically categorizable parts, but syntax is more a matter of determining rules or patterns for how these parts can be arranged and interrelated so to form meaningful sentences. From page 26:

Syntactical analysis, when included in ancient grammars, amounts to the combination of the parts of speech, as based on their morphological characteristics, which were known as ‘accidents’. Ancient grammar adheres to a hierarchical principle according to which elements (στοιχεῖα) of each level are combined in order to form units of a higher level: combinations of letters form syllables, those of syllables words, words are combined to form sentences (e.g. Holtz 1981: 60-61 and Baratin 1989: 9, and note 16).

This hierarchical viewpoint is present in the earliest linguistic speculation when pursued within dialectic. ‘Syntax’ represents the highest level in this hierarchy, that is the level of speaking (λέγειν) defined by Plato and Aristotle as that in which it is possible to assert something. Two items were recognized by them on the previous level, that of naming (ὀνομάζειν), namely noun/subject (ὄνομα) and verb/predicate (ῥῆμα)

(26)

]

The component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) is where true and false statements are made. The constituents of statements, cases and predicates, are deficient sayables. As far as I can see, in the Stoic system one cannot combine the noun and the verb, i.e. items of the component of expression (φωvαί), to effect statement-making because the parts of speech as such do not have syntactic force. Units of meaning (σημαινόμενα) are combined, that is cases and predicates. That truth and falsehood do not pertain to individual words (φωναί) but to their combination is a conclusion which the Stoics would seem to share with Plato and Aristotle. I am thus inclined to think that syntax, just like the question of truth and falsehood, pertained solely to the component of sayables (λεχτά) or meaning for the Stoics.

(72)

 

 

5.5.2.6

[A λόγος (speech, sentence) is an intelligible, articulate utterance. A λέξις is an articulate sound that may not be intelligible. And a φωνή is a sound that may not even be articulate. There are two related sorts of speech acts: {1} προφέρεσθαι (uttering), which is associated with the linguistic item φωναί (vocal sounds), and {2} λέγειν (speaking), which is assocated with πράγματα (states of affairs) and thus also with λεκτά (sayables).]

 

Luhtala next examines the relation between the notions of λεκτόν (sayable) and λόγος (speech or sentence) (72). [The concepts here seem to be organized in the following way. We begin with the least rational or logically structured thing and move toward the most. The first is φωνή (voice). It can be simply noise or it can be a sound with linguistic significance. Next is λέξις (articulate sound), which, like φωνή (voice) is composed of sounds, but it is unlike φωνή in that λέξις is articulate (which I think means it forms sounds which are language-like or which at least are candidates for carriers of significance.) The next is λόγος (speech, sentence), which is like λέξις in that both are articulate sounds, but the difference is that a λόγος has a certain meaning, while  a λέξις might be unintelligible, as in the example of blituri. (See this entry on Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VII,57). We now stop with this hierarchy, and we consider two sorts of speech acts, which are involved in the prior classifications: {1} προφέρεσθαι (uttering), which is associated with the linguistic item φωναί (vocal sounds), and {2} λέγειν (speaking), which is assocated with πράγματα (states of affairs) and thus also with λεκτά (sayables).]

The concept of λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’) occurs in the following hierarchy of linguistic expressions reported by Diogenes Laertius (VII,56-57):

Φωνή (voice’) differs from λέξις (articulated sound’). Because, while the former may include mere noise, the latter is always articulate. Λέξις (‘articulate sound’) again differs from λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’) because the latter always signifies something, whereas a λέξις (articulated sound’), as for example blituri, may be unintelligible, which a λόγος never is. And speaking/saying (λέγειν) is different from uttering (προφέρεσθαι); for while | vocal sounds (φωναί) are uttered, states of affairs (πράγματα) are said, and sayables pertain to states of affairs.116

A distinction is drawn here between two kinds of speech acts, that of uttering (προφέρεσθαι) and that of speaking (λέγειν), which are associated with two kinds of linguistic items, vocal sounds (φωναί) and states of affairs (πράγματα), respectively. Furthermore, sayables (λεκτά) are said to pertain to states of affairs (πράγματα). This idea of two kinds of speech acts would seem to correspond closely to the distinction between the two components of dialectic. We know that vocal/articulate sounds belong to the component of expression and states of affairs/sayables to the component of meaning.

116. διαφέρει δὲ φωνὴ καὶ λέξις, ὅτι φωνὴ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἦχός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ τὸ ἔναρθρον μόνον. λέξις δὲ λόγου διαφέρει, ὅτι λόγος ἀεὶ σημαντικός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ καὶ ἄσημος, ὡς ἡ βλίτυρι, λόγος δὲ οὐδαμῶς. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν τοῦ προφέρεσθαι: προφέρονται μὲν γὰρ αἱ φωναί, λέγεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα, ἃ δὴ καὶ λεκτὰ τυγχάνει.. [See Perseus 57] See Long/Sedley:  Most editors accept Casaubon’s supplement, οἶον ἡμέρα ἐστί, after ἐκπεμπομένη. This may be right, but there is no reason to think that a λόγος has to be a complete sayable  (1987 II:197 n. 2). I am inclined to accept Casaubon’s supplement.

(72-73)

 

 

 

5.5.2.7

[λόγος can take the form of speech. Since meaningful speech comes from the throat, which is near the heart, Diogenes of Babylon thought that the mind is in the heart and not the head.]

 

[The “syntactical nature of the notion of λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’)” seems to be the fact that conceptualizable things about the world have a rational structure that is paralleled by the relation between parts of propositions, as for example the way that a thing and its properties is represented in the subject-predicate structure.] In the next paragraph we will see a quote by Diogenes of Babylon. His point will correspond with our understanding of the “syntactical nature of the notion of λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’)” (73). For, while λέξις is a vocal sound that can be written as a word, λόγος  instead is a “meaningful vocal sound that issues from the mind” and which takes the form of a proposition, like, “It is day” (73, citing Diog. Laert. VII,55-56). [The next point seems to be the following. We have made a linguistic point by distinguishing mere vocalized signification, which will take the form of simple terms, and conceptualized signification, which can also be vocalized in the form of propositions. The realm of mere vocalization lacks the rational component of logical syntax. But the Stoics make this distinction between vocal speech (φωνή) and meaningful speech (λόγος) for another purpose, “namely to show that the source of thinking and speaking is the same” (74). The idea in this latter half of this paragraph and in the next might be the following, but please see pages 73-74 to be sure. We begin by assuming that we do not know where in our anatomy our mind is located. For example, it could be in the head or it could be in the heart. The next assumption we make is that wherever is the source from which rational articulations arise is the place where the mind is. We then observe that both mere speech and meaningful articulate speech are sent out from the throat region. Next we note that this region is physiologically near to the heart, and more distant from the head. Thus, the mind is located in the heart.]

 

 

5.5.2.8

[This notion of the rational thought being expressible through vocalization reflects the dichotomy between {a} λόγος  as rational thought or meaningful speech and {b} λέξις or φωναί as mere speech that does not necessarily express a propositionally structurable thought.]

 

Luhtala then quotes Diogenes of Babylon, making this point we noted above, that since meaningful speech comes from the throat, which is near the heart, the mind is in the heart and not the head. Following this is a quote from Chrysippus that makes the same point (74, quoting: [Chrysippus maybe or perhaps Galen] De Plac. II 5, 18-20, tr. De Lacy 1978: 131). Luhtala then relates Chrysippus’ notion with Plato’s “twofold description of speech, thought and spoken, in the Sophist.” [Here the idea seems to be that speech in thought, which is silent, has another side to it when it is articulated into vocalized speech. See p.75.]

 

 

5.5.2.9

[The Stoic notion of sayables is like Plato’s notion of internal speech, however, for the Stoics, when the sayable is given vocal utterance, it becomes corporeal speech (λόγῳ).]

 

Luhtala then compares the Stoic notion of sayables with Plato’s notion of internal speech, “which precedes the actual enunciation of spoken words;” for, “Sayables would thus literally be something that could be uttered but actually need not be uttered” (75). [However, one difference is that for the Stoics, as soon as the sayable is uttered, it becomes corporeal speech (λόγῳ).

This is in accordance with what we know of the relationship between speech and thought in the Stoic theory: the rational impression (φαντασία) comes first, then thought which is able to speak (διάνοια εχλαλητιχή) expresses its experience by means of speech (λόγῳ) (Diog. Laert. VII,49).

(75)

 

 

 

5.5.2.10

[The λόγος  of meaningful articulate speech is incorporeal, but the speech as mere vocal sounds φωναί is corporeal, because it has an effect.]

 

For the Stoics, meaningful articulate speech as λόγος  [or as sayable] occupies the incorporeal ontological sphere. However, the parts of speech as vocal sounds (φωναί) lie in the corporeal ontological sphere, because they have an effect:

For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect for whatever produces an effect is corporeal. Voice, as it proceeds from those | who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect. (Diog. Laert. VII,55 = SVF 2.140, tr. R.H. Hicks; cf. Aet. Plac. IV,20,2 = SVF 2.387 and Suda s.v. σῶμα.)120

120. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι: ποιεῖ δὲ ἡ φωνὴ προσιοῦσα τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν φωνούντων. [Following Perseus]

(75-76)

[Note, in my version of the Hick’s translation, the quote does not have this redundancy in its formulation. It reads simply as one sentence: “For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect.” See 56 at Perseus.]

 

 

 

5.5.2.11

[The Stoic theory of meaning and expression distinguishes three units: {1} a corporeal sound (φωνήν), which is a signifier (σημαῖνον) {2} the corporeal sound’s ‘signification’ (σημαινόμενον), which lies in the intellect and is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν) and is thus incorporeal, and {3} the referent (τυγχάνον), which is the physical object in the world corresponding to the signification, and is thus corporeal.]

 

The Stoic theory [of meaning] has three units: {1} a corporeal sound (φωνήν), which is a signifier (σημαῖνον) {2} the corporeal sound’s ‘signification’ (σημαινόμενον), which lies in the intellect and is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν) [when it is formulated propositionally such that it could be either true or false], [also, it might be a matter of the motion of thought (κινήσει τῆς διανοίας)] and {3} the referent (τυγχάνον), which is the physical object in the world corresponding to the signification (76). The corporeal sound and its signfication lie in the realm of dialectic. The referent, however, is a matter of physics. Luhtala notes that Sextus may have misrepresented the theory by portraying the signification as a term, which cannot be true or false. Instead of it being the notion of “Dion”, it should rather be a proposition like “Dion walks” [See these entries on that topic.]

It is customary to view the Stoic theory as involving three units, a corporeal sound, its ‘signification’ and the referent. Two of them belong to the domain of dialectic whereas the third component, the object in the external world, which activates the impression, belongs to the physical theory. The Stoic theory is generally illustrated with a passage from Sextus Empiricus, who records the Stoic position in the course of his exposition of a controversy concerning the sphere of truth in the doctrines of the various philosophical schools (see e.g. Müller 1978: 7; Graeser 1978: 78):

The Stoics defended the first opinion (according to which true and false is a question of the signification), saying that three things are linked together, ‘the signification’, ‘the signifier’, and ‘the name-bearer’. The signifier is an utterance, for instance ‘Dion’; the signified is the actual state of affairs revealed by an utterance, which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our thought whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different although they hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the external object, for instance, Dion himself. Of these, two are bodies – the utterance and the name-bearer; but one is incorporeal – the state of affairs signified and sayable, which is true or false. (Adv. math. VIII, 11-13, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 195)121

121. Ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν πρώτη περὶ τἀληθοῦς διαφωνία τοιαύτη τις ὑπῆρχεν. ἦν  δὲ καί ἄλλη τις παpὰ τούτοις διάστασις, καθ᾽ ἣν οἱ μὲν πεpὶ τῷ σημαινομὲνῳ τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ ψεῦδος ὑπεστήσαντο, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῇ φωνῇ, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῇ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας. καὶ δὴ τῆς μὲν πρώτης δόξης προεστήκασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς,  τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαινόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ὧν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνήν, οἷον τὴν Δίων, σημαινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς δηλούμενον καὶ οὗ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ παρυφισταμένου διανοίᾳ, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι οὐκ ἐπαΐουσι καίπερ τῆς φωνῆς ἀκούοντες, τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ Δίων. τούτων δὲ δύο μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἓν δὲ ἀσώματον, ὥσπερ τὸ σημαινόμενον πρᾶγμα, καὶ λεκτόν ὅπερ ἀληθές τε γίνεται ἢ ψεῦδος. καὶ τοῦτο οὐ κοινῶς πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐλλιπές τὸ δὲ αὐτοτελές. The ‘name-bearer’ appears to be an infelicitous translation for τυγχάνον because this text has to do with statement-making rather than name-giving. Ι have replaced it by ‘case-bearer’ which Long and Sedley use elsewhere (1987: 201).

(76)

[For an online transcription: 8.11; 8.12. Below is an image of a text for reference.

Sextus Empiricus. Adv Math Bk8 ln10-13.2.

Here is another translation:

11. ... And there was yet another quarrel among the dogmatists; for some located the true and false in the thing signified, some located it in the utterance, and some in the motion of the intellect. And the Stoics championed the first view, saying that three things are linked with one another: the thing signified, the signifier, and the object. 12. Of these, the signifier is the utterance, for example, ‘Dion’. The thing signified is the thing indicated by the utterance and which we grasp when it subsists in our intellect and which foreigners do not understand although they hear the utterance. The object is the external existent, for example, Dion himself. Two of these are bodies, the utterance and the object, and one incorporeal, the signified thing, i.e., the thing said [lekton] which is true or false. This last point is not of unrestricted application, but some lekta are incomplete and some complete. One kind of complete lekton is the so-called proposition, which they describe thus: a proposition is that which is true or false.

(Stoic Reader 89)

]

 

 

5.5.2.12

[We are concerned with the propositions resulting from rational impressions, which correspond to sayables. We are not concerned with other sorts of sentences.]

 

[In addition to issues of syntax,] Luhtala will also be examining “the propositions resulting from rational impressions which are the essential subject matter of the theory of sayables (λεχτά)” (77), and she will exclude any non-propositional sorts of formulations (77-78). Matters of expression will only interest us insofar as they are “relevant to the syntax of deficient and complete sayables” (77).

 

 

5.5.2.13

[Our concern is not with name-giving or etymology.]

 

Luhtala is also not concerned with “name-giving and the etymological procedures” (78).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From:

 

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

 

 

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

 

[Note, for “Aet. Plac.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Aetius’s Placita Philosophorum.]

 

[Note, for Chrysippus or Galen De Plac. II 5, 18-20, tr. De Lacy 1978, I could not find either in the Bibliography. Perhaps it is Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. And perhaps for the translation: Galenus / Phillip Howard De Lacy. Galeni de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis = Galen on the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato.      Berlin [-Ost] : Akademie-Verlag, 1978-1984. Worldcat link.]

 

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

The Perseus Greek page for the Diogenes’ passages:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0257%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

The Perseus English page for the Diogenes’ passages:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

 

Graeser, Andrea. 1978. “The Stoic Theory of Meaning”. Rist (1978: 77-100).

 

Müller, Ian. 1978 “An Introduction to Stoic Logic”. Rist (1978: 1-26).

 

Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.

 

Suda ( = Suida). Suidae Lexicon. Ed. by Ada Adler. Leipzig: Teubner 1931.

 

SVF: Stoicorum veterum fragmenta I-III. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1905-24.

 

 

Texts I cite:

 

Sextus Empiricus. 1914. Sexti Empirici Opera. Vol. 2, Adversus Dogmaticos, libros quinque (Adv. Mathem. VII-XI) continens, edited by Hermannus Mutschmann. Lipsiae [Leipzig]: Teubneri [Teubner]. Available online:

https://archive.org/details/sextiempiriciope12sext

Online text transcription at:

http://socratics.daphnet.org

[specifically here]

 

2008. The Stoic Reader. Selected Writings and Testimonia. Translated by Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson. Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett.

 

 

This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:

http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/04/stoic-logic-and-semantics-components-of.html

 

 

.

6 Feb 2017

Luhtala (5.5.1) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “Rational Impressions”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Anneli Luhtala

 

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

 

Ch.5 The Stoics

 

5.5 Stoic Logic

 

5.5.1 Rational Impressions

 

 

Brief summary:

We obtain rational impressions (λογικὴ φαντασία) from real situations in the world [which operates according to reason (λόγος)] leaving impressions (φαντασίαι) on the leading part of our soul (ἡγεμονικόν). The situation in the world has some rational sense to it, which is its “sayable” (λεκτόν). The same sayable corresponds to our rational impression, and that sayable can be rendered into a linguistic utterance, taking the form of a proposition, whose syntactical structure is isomorphic to the conceptual structure of the sayable.

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

5.5.1.1

[Dialectic is conducted on the basis of rational impressions in our mind that were made by existing things leaving impressions on the leading part of our soul.]

 

Stoic dialectic is based on the knowledge we gain of the world. In their epistemology, existing things activate impressions (φαντασίαι) in our mind (that is, in the “leading part of the human soul, the ἡγεμονικόν”) by means of sense-perceptions.

Stoic dialectic was based on epistemology, so that ‘impressions’ (φαντασίαι) held the first place in their treatment of dialectic. ‘Impressions’ are what occur in the human mind on the basis of sense-perceptions, which are caused by external objects in the leading part of the human soul, the ἡγεμονικόν.104 An impression is activated by ‘existing things’ and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with ‘what is’ (Diog Laert. | VII,46; Adv. math. VIII,85-86).105 In Stoic physics only corporeal entities are said really to exist and have causal efficacy. The ‘existing things’ can thus be interpreted as perceptible objects affecting the leading part of the soul, ἡγεμονικόν.106 An impression (φαντασίαι) is understood either as an imprint (τύπωσις) or alteration (ἑτεροίωσις) in the soul (SVF 2.53-9), which produces a movement in the soul (Adv. math.VII,242 = SVF 2.65). By a rational impression (λογικὴ φαντασία) is understood a presentation which is typical of a living being possessed of reason and speech. If it originates from something which is clear, it is called a cognitive impression (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία) (Long & Sedley 1987: 250). According to Sextus Empiricus, a rational impression (λογικὴ φαντασία) is a presentation in which it is possible to set the thing presented before the mind by means of speech (λόγῳ) (Adv. math. VIII,70); it is also called ‘thought-process’ (νόησις) (Diog. Laert. VII,51).107

104. The soul, which is regarded a physical by the Stoics, consists of eight parts. The | commanding-part is called the ἡγεμονικόν. When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has the commanding-part of his soul like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon. On this he inscribes each one of his conceptions. Reason is said to be completed during our first seven years (Aet. Plac. IV,11,1-4 = SVF 2.83).

105. ... καταληπτικὴν μέν, ἣν κριτήριον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων φασί, τὴν γινομένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην (Diog. Laert. VII,46; cf. also Aet. Plac. IV,12,1-5 = SVF 2.54).

106 But, according to the Stoics, knowledge can also be gained through processes other than immediate sense observations. An impression (φαντασίαι) can originate also in reasoning. The procedure involved is that of μετάβασις, a form of inference starting from sense-data. The Stoics claimed that the soul cannot be immediately affected by incorporeals but it can be impressed ‘in relation to sayables’ (Adv. math. VIII,409 = SVF 2.85). See Atherton (1993: 255 ff.) and Schubert (1994: 131-141).

107. αἱ μὲν οὖν λογικαὶ (sc. φαντασίαι) νοήσεις εἰσίν (those which are rational are processes of thought”); cf. Galen (Def. med. 126,19,381). I disagree with Kerferd, who proposes the following translation for this pasage: “A rational presentation is one in which the object of the phantasia is to be (i.e. can be) presented rationally (i.e. in and for the reason)” (1978 : 253-254).

(67-68)

 

 

5.5.1.2

[Our rational impressions, which are based on impressions from real states of affairs in the world, correspond to the sense or sayable of the event, which can be articulated into a linguistic utterance whose syntax is isomorphic to the structural features of the sayable it expresses.]

 

[So far we have  been discussing the role of thought processes with regard to rational impressions. But] the rational impression can enter into the form of a linguistic utterance, which is isomorphic with the  “sayable / λεκτόν”. Since the rational impression was caused by a real situation in the world, the expression will take a form of a proposition. [At this point it is not clear to what the sayable is and how it would differ from the linguistic expression. It could be something like the sense of a proposition. As such, it would lie between the state of affairs and the vocalized or conceptualized utterance in the sense that it holds for both and is like a bridge between them. I will quote this paragraph in full, and I may return to this part later to revise it, as I learn more.] The sayable / λεκτόν has composing units that correspond with the proposition’s parts of speech. [The next point might be that the sayables are on the side of that which is being signified and the proposition is on the side of that which is doing the signifying. But I am not certain yet.]

When the impression is associated with thought-processes and speech, the link with the linguistic theory becomes obvious, namely with the theory of the so-called ‘sayables’ (λεκτά). Indeed, the notion of ‘sayable’ (λεκτόν) is defined as that which subsists in accordance with a rational impression (Diog. Laert. VII,63).108 Diogenes Laertius epitomizes as follows the process by which articulate speech develops on the basis of ‘impressions’: |

Impression leads the way; then thought, which is able to speak, expresses in discourse what it experiences as a result of the impression. (Diog. Laert. VII,49)109

That which results from rational impressions would thus seem to take the form of propositions.110 The following statement, which is attributed to Chrysippus, displays the association between ‘right reason’ and the syntax of the parts of speech.

Philosophy, whether it is the care for, or the knowledge of, right reason, is the discipline concerned with reason (λόγος). For if we are completely familiar with the parts of speech (τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων) and their syntax (τῆς συντάξεως αὐτῶν), we will make use of it (i.e. the λόγος) in an expert way. By λόγος I mean the one that by nature belongs to all rational beings. (SVF 2.131, tr. Frede 1978: 60-62)

The intimate relationship between the theory of λεκτά (‘sayables’) and items of language, the parts of speech, is well-known. As Long and Sedley put it,

sayables are not merely, as has often been observed, ‘isomorphic’ with language. They are parasitic on it, to the extent of being analysable largely into the words used to express them. (Long/Sedley 1987: 200-201)111

The correspondence between the parts of speech, and the corresponding units of λεκτά (‘sayables’) is reflected in the Stoic division of dialectic into its two components, the one dealing with what signifies (σημαίνοντα) and the other dealing with what is said or signified (λεκτόν, σημαινόμενα) (Diog. Laert. VII,43). In my opinion, this correspondence should be understood in such a way that the parts of speech in the former component | were described with a view to their roles in statement-making in the latter. The parts of speech are thus supposed to be described in terms of such features as are relevant for propositional analysis. A similar tendency was noted in the Peri hermeneias in which the noun (ὄνομα) and the verb (ῥῆμα) seemed to be tailor-made for the subject and predicate functions in statement-making.

108. Φασῖ δὲ (τὸ) λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. [See Perseus]

109. προηγεῖται γὰρ ἡ φαντασία, εἶθ᾽ ἡ διάνοια ἐκλαλητικὴ ὑπάρχουσα, ὃ πάσχει ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας, τοῦτο ἐκφέρει λόγῳ (tr. Long 1974: 125). [See Perseus]

110. I agree with Long and Sedley when they claim that “all impressions of mature human beings are envisaged to have a propositional content” (1987: 240): “To say that ‘sayables subsist in accordance with a rational impression’ seems to be a way of making the point that the rationality of a thought consists in its relationship to a sayable, which will normally be a proposition” (1987: 200). Cf. also Annas (1980: 88-89): “So a presentation, while in itself an imprint or alteration, not the kind of thing which can be true or false, is to be thought of a something with a content which can be expressed in a proposition, and this is true or false”.

111. See also Kneale/Kneale (1962: 143): “Although lekta are to be distinguished from any spoken sounds, words, or sentences, it is clear that a lekton can be identified only by use of a word or sentence which expresses it, and it is not surprising that the divisions of lekta should correspond fairly closely with the divisions of speech.” Cf. Egli (1978: 138); Graeser (1978: 80).

(68-70)

 

 

 

 

From:

 

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

 

 

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

 

[Note, for “Aet. Plac.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Aetius’s Placita Philosophorum.]

 

Annas, Julia. 1980. “Truth and Knowledge”. Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Ed. by M. Schofield, J. Burnyeat, J. Barnes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 84-104.

 

Atherton, Catherine. 1993. The Stoics on Ambiguity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

 

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Frede, Michael. 1978. “Principles of Stoic Grammar”. Rist (1978: 7-75).

 

Graeser, Andrea. 1978. “The Stoic Theory of Meaning”. Rist (1978: 77-100).

 

Kerferd, George B. 1978. “The Problem of synkatathesis and katalepsis in Stoic doctrine”. Brunschwig (1978: 251-272).

 

Kneale, William C. / Kneale, Martha. 1962. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

 

Long, Anthony A. 1974. Hellenistic Philosophy. London, New York: Charles Scribner’s sons.

 

Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

 

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Schubert, Andreas. 1994. Untersuchungen zur stoischen Bedeutungslehr. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. (Hypomnemata. 103.).

 

SVF: Stoicorum veterum fragmenta I-III. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1905-24.

 

 

This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:

http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/04/5.html

 

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